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ABSTRACT. The United States' aggressive War on Terror policies since 9/11 have led to sig-
nificant prison sentences for many young American Muslims, even when their charged criminal
conduct cannot be tied to any act of violence in the United States or abroad. A primary reason
provided for their severe punishment is that these individuals are uniquely dangerous, cannot be
deterred or rehabilitated, and must be incapacitated to protect society from their ideologically
violent goals. In the 198os and 1990s, similar accusations were raised in the War on Drugs
against young African-Americans, who were described as remorseless "super-predators" and re-
ceived lengthy sentences in an effort to reduce drug and gang violence across the United States.
Through a comparative analysis between federal sentencing policies in the Wars on Terror and
Drugs, this Feature explains how these policies have disproportionately targeted particular mi-
nority communities and have led to sentences for young nonviolent offenders that undermine
effective strategies to combat violence in the United States. In response to harms created by the
War on Drugs, policymakers have instituted numerous reforms to reduce the length of drug-
related sentences and focus on alternative means of addressing drug crimes and rehabilitating
offenders. However, as this Feature explains, the lessons learned from counterproductive War on
Drugs sentencing policies have not yet been translated to the War on Terror. This Feature advo-
cates for a more effective and just counterterrorism strategy that would provide for greater nu-
ance in sentencing terrorism offenders and focus on rehabilitation rather than on lengthy puni-
tive incarceration.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 9/11, the U.S. government has undertaken an aggressive War on Ter-
ror to target violent extremist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS that are based in
Muslim-majority countries. In recent years, a handful of violent shootings and
bombings by self-identified Muslims in Boston, San Bernardino, and Orlan-
do -in addition to more deadly attacks in Europe, Africa, South Asia, and the
Middle East-have exacerbated fears of terrorism and the need to combat it.
For the most part, the United States has adopted a zero-tolerance, preventative
counterterrorism strategy of arresting anyone who may support foreign terror-
ist groups and incapacitating them with lengthy terms of incarceration. Federal
law enforcement has a variety of tools at its disposal to implement this policy,
including "material support for terrorism" statutes to prosecute offenders and
sentencing guidelines to put them away for decades in prison. These tactics
have been used even when the offenders' conduct cannot be tied to any act of
violence in the United States or abroad. A primary justification given for these
extraordinarily punitive measures is that those affiliated with terrorist activi-
ty - primarily young Muslim men - are uniquely dangerous: because they can-
not be deterred or rehabilitated, they must instead be incapacitated to protect
society from their ideologically violent goals.
Twenty to thirty years ago, similar accusations were levied against another
group of individuals - young African American men - in the War on Drugs.
Concerned about the rise of drug and gang violence in the 198os and 1990s,
government officials argued that remorseless inner-city "super-predators" must
be incapacitated to stem the tide of death and destruction across the United
States.' To address the problem, the government instituted a series of harsh
penalties to significantly increase the criminal sentences for a wide range of
drug-related conduct. However, the majority of individuals sentenced were not
hardened violent criminals, but rather nonviolent low-level drug offenders. 2
Many now recognize that these War on Drugs policies have caused significant
and disproportionate harm to African American communities, where one-third
of African American men are expected to be incarcerated during their lifetime.'




2. See infra Section I.B.
3. Thomas P. Bonczar, Special Report: Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-
2oo, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 1 (Aug. 2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piuspo1.pdf
[http://pernta.cc/N7UA-3JDR]; Jonathan Rothwell, How the War on Drugs Damages Black
Social Mobility, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.brookings.edu
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In recent years, changes in Supreme Court precedent, the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines, and charging policies have led to a reduction in the length
of drug-related sentences, and policymakers have focused on alternative means
of addressing drug crimes and rehabilitating offenders.
Similar to the War on Drugs, many of the individuals that have been sen-
tenced in the War on Terror are not hardened remorseless terrorists. In fact, a
number are young, disaffected American Muslims with little to no criminal his-
tory, whose anger over the killings of Muslims throughout the Middle East and
the discrimination against Muslims in the United States has made them sus-
ceptible to the views of terrorist groups like ISIS.4 Furthermore, just like the
War on Drugs, the government's sentencing policies -in particular the Sen-
tencing Guidelines' Terrorism Enhancement- fail to take into account the
differences between a violent terrorist who has killed dozens and an American
Muslim teenager who tweets support for ISIS online. Despite these similarities,
this Feature contends that the lessons learned from counterproductive War on
Drugs sentencing laws have not yet been translated to the War on Terror. In-
stead, terrorism sentencing policies have caused harm to Muslim communities
similar to that of African American communities in the War on Drugs. This is
despite the fact that Muslims convicted of terrorism offenses make up only a
few hundred of the millions of Muslims living in the United States.s And, like
the War on Drugs, the War on Terror policies have failed to serve the purposes
of criminal sentencing or to contribute to an effective counterterrorism policy.
This Feature proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a background of the
sentencing policies of the Wars on Terror and Drugs that have led to long pris-
on terms. It argues that these policies fail to take into account the seriousness
of the offense and the characteristics of the individual defendant. Part II
demonstrates how policymakers justified these laws by arguing that the
"unique" nature of the individuals who commit certain drug and terrorism
offenses makes them unable to be rehabilitated or deterred. This Part further
argues that this premise has no support, and as a result, young Muslims and
African Americans have received sentences for nonviolent conduct that far ex-
/blog/social-mobility-memos/2o14/o9/3o/how-the-war-on-drugs-damages-black-socia
-mobility [http://perma.cc/YHP8-J6U 4 ].
4. See infra Section II.A.2.
5. By the Numbers: U.S. Prosecutions of Jihadist Terror Crimes, 2001-2013, CTR. ON NAT'L SECURI-
TY FORDHAM L. [hereinafter By the Numbers], http://statici.squarespace.com/static
/55dc76f7e4bol3c872183fea/t/56b88efl356fboff2p1aa 5 a/14 54 9 3 5 7 9 4 12o/JihadistFactSheet2oo
1-13 .pdf [http://perma.cc/SB8Z-S 7 2B]; Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Main-
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ceed the purposes of federal sentencing delineated by Congress. While ac-
knowledging that the percentage of African Americans imprisoned under the
War on Drugs policies has been much higher than that of Muslims imprisoned
under the War on Terror policies, Part III explains how these lengthy sentences
have negatively impacted African American and Muslim communities in simi-
lar ways, including increased discrimination, distrust of law enforcement, and
the failure to effectively rehabilitate offenders. Part IV explains how recent re-
forms have been implemented to counter these harmful consequences of the
War on Drugs, leading to lower sentences and a renewed focus on rehabilitat-
ing drug offenders. However, the lessons learned from the War on Drugs have
not been applied to the more recent War on Terror. The government has failed
to sufficiently address similar concerns in the War on Terror largely due to an
oversized fear of foreign terrorists groups as well as the desire of government
officials to be viewed as "tough" on terrorism without realizing the significant
adverse consequences of their policies. Just as with the recent changes to drug
sentencing policies, a more effective and just counterterrorism strategy would
provide for greater nuance in sentencing terrorism offenders and focus on re-
habilitation rather than only on lengthy punitive incarceration.
I. CRIMINAL SENTENCING IN THE WARS ON TERROR AND DRUGS
A. War on Terror
Soon after 9/11, the U.S. government launched the War on Terror to de-
stroy Al Qaeda and other like-minded terrorist groups that threatened the
United States and its allies.' As part of the War on Terror, the government
adopted a strategy of proactively preventing terrorist attacks before they take
place and incapacitating any individual who supports terrorist organizations.
Attorney General John Ashcroft instructed the Department of Justice to "pre-
vent first, prosecute second."' To achieve this goal, the government expanded a
series of laws and policies to allow law enforcement officials to arrest individu-
als well before they can commit or support violent acts and sentence them to
lengthy terms of incarceration.' These changes included broadening the Sen-
6. President George W. Bush, Address to a joint Session of Congress and the American People,
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 20, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news
/releases/2001/o9/200lo920-8.html [http://perma.cc/D6WP-K8DQ].
7. Homeland Defense: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 107th Cong. 9 (2001)
(statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
8. George D. Brown, Punishing Terrorists: Congress, the Sentencing Commission, the Guidelines,
and the Courts, 23 CORNELL J. L. &PUB. POL'Y 517, 547-48 (2014).
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tencing Guidelines Terrorism Enhancement and federal terrorism statutes.' As
George Brown writes, "If prevention is at the heart of counter-terrorism, harsh
sentences seem appropriate here as well."o The government does not want to
"wait until there are victims of terrorist attacks to fully enforce the nation's
criminal laws against terrorism."1
1. The Sentencing Guidelines Terrorism Enhancement
The primary reason why individuals convicted of terrorism-related conduct
have received extraordinarily long criminal sentences is due to section 3A1.4 of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, also known as the "Terrorism En-
hancement."' 2 The Terrorism Enhancement significantly increases the sentenc-
ing range (known as the "Guidelines range") that federal judges use when de-
ciding the appropriate term of incarceration.
The Terrorism Enhancement is just one of many adjustments contained in
the Guidelines created by the United States Sentencing Commission.' The
Guidelines establish various sentencing ranges based on a chart cross-
referencing forty-three "offense levels" with six "criminal history" categories. 14
For example, someone convicted of a serious crime with an offense level of for-
ty-two and a lengthy criminal history (Category VI) would receive a Guidelines
range of 360 months to life, while someone convicted of a lesser crime with an
offense level of twelve and very little criminal history (Category I) would re-
ceive a Guidelines range of ten to sixteen months." The Guidelines also con-
tain many adjustments based on the characteristics of the offense, the offender,
9. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
10. Brown, supra note 8, at 547.
11. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 264 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Joshua L. Dratel, The Literal Third Way in Approaching "Material Support for Ter-
rorism": Whatever Happened to 18 U.S.C. 5 2339B(C) and the Civil Injunctive Option?, 57
WAYNE L. REV. 11, 8o (2011) ("The government's preemptive strategy has also resulted in
the expansion of inchoate crimes such as attempt and conspiracy, as making arrests earlier
along the time continuum further distances the defendant's conduct from a completed sub-
stantive crime, or even an agreement to commit a specific offense.").
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
13. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, 1989-90 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2012)).
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or the victim."6 The adjustments can increase or decrease the offense level
and/or the criminal history category. The Terrorism Enhancement is one such
adjustment.
While federal judges were originally required to sentence defendants within
the calculated Guidelines range, in 2005 the Supreme Court in United States v.
Booker struck down the mandatory Guidelines regime as unconstitutional."
Although the Guidelines are now only advisory, they continue to be the start-
ing point to calculate the sentence for every federal offense, and courts, for the
most part, attempt to sentence individuals within the range. For example, in
2015, 76.6% of defendants received a sentence either within the Guidelines
range or below the range when the proposed sentence was sponsored by the
prosecution.' Moreover, if a court elects to impose a sentence outside the
range, it must demonstrate why it is reasonable to do so." Therefore, the
Guidelines, including the Terrorism Enhancement, still play an important role
in determining the sentences of individuals convicted of terrorism offenses.
The Terrorism Enhancement was created pursuant to the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, where Congress directed the Sen-
tencing Commission "to provide an appropriate enhancement for any felony,
whether committed within or outside the United States, that involves or is in-
tended to promote international terrorism, unless such involvement or intent is
itself an element of the crime."20 Although the Enhancement initially applied
only to international terrorism, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 expanded the Terrorism Enhancement to apply to domestic terror-
ism as well.2 1 After 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act further expanded the En-
hancement, making it applicable to a broad category of terrorism-related
offenses, including: (1) crimes involving terrorism, but not falling within the
statutory definition of "federal crime of terrorism"; (2) obstructing an investi-
gation of a federal crime of terrorism; (3) harboring or concealing a terrorist;
and (4) intending to influence the government's conduct by intimidation or co-
16. Id. at 343-74.
17. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27, 267 (2005).
i8. National Comparison of Sentence Imposed and Position Relative to the Guideline Range, Fiscal
Year 2015, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION tbl.N (2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites
/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/201 5/TableN
.pdf [http://perma.cc/7T9V-V6GX].
ig. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 134-35 (2d Cit. 2009).
20. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120004,
io8 Stat. 1796, 2022 (1994).
21. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 730, 11o Stat.
1214, 1303.
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ercion, retaliate against government conduct, or influence a civilian population
by intimidation or coercion.22 In addition to the commission of the actual
crime, the Terrorism Enhancement also applies to inchoate offenses. 23 There-
fore, while the Guidelines usually permit an offense level reduction for uncom-
pleted crimes under section 2X1.1(b), for terrorism offenses, defendants who
conspire or attempt to commit a crime are treated exactly the same as those
who actually commit the crime.
Although the Terrorism Enhancement has been expanded significantly to
apply to a broad range of conduct, its effect on an individual's sentence has re-
mained the same since its enactment. A defendant's offense level is increased by
twelve levels, but cannot be lower than thirty-two.25 His criminal history cate-
gory is also increased to Category VI, the highest level. 26 The minimum Guide-
lines range under the Terrorism Enhancement is 210 to 262 months (17.5 to 21.8
years).2 Of all the adjustments in the Guidelines, the Terrorism Enhancement
is the most severe.28 As an example, the Enhancement can lead to a sentence
from thirty years to life for a crime that would otherwise result in a sentence of
around five years.29
2. The Exceptionality of Terrorism Sentencing
Post-Booker, federal courts are instructed to fashion a sentence based on a
variety of statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including "the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defend-
ant."" However, unlike with other crimes, sentencing in the terrorism con-
text- and the Terrorism Enhancement especially- fails to address these factors.
22. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272;
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 637 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2002); id. § 3A1.4 cmt. n.4.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 747 F.3 d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2014).
24. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 2X1.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
25. Id. 5 3A1.4(a).
26. Id. § 3As.4 (b).
27. Id. 403-04 tbl.
28. See Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions, COLUM. L.
SCH. HUM. RTs. INST. & HUM. RTs. WATCH 124 (July 21, 2014) [hereinafter Illusion
ofJustice], http://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/21/illusion-justice/human-rights-abuses-us
-terrorism-prosecutions [http://perma.cc/56DJ-YLRM].
29. Id. at 125.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012).
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The Terrorism Enhancement treats all offenders the same, without taking into
account their actual conduct or individual background, such as age and crimi-
nal history."1 Thus, the Enhancement undermines a basic principle of U.S. sen-
tencing law and its underlying commitment to retributive justice: that pun-
ishment should be proportional to the crime. 32
Criminal conduct subject to the Enhancement varies significantly: from
planning and participating in a violent attack that kills hundreds of people to
making false statements to law enforcement officials. Yet the Terrorism En-
hancement does not take into account this broad range of conduct, and the re-
sulting Guidelines range is often inconsistent with the actual statutes that crim-
inalize the underlying conduct in the first place. For example, the material
support for terrorism statutes prohibit providing "material support" - such as
money, training, expert advice, and assistance-to terrorists.33 Unlike the En-
hancement, these statutes recognize that different levels of support require
different punishments. While 18 U.S.C. § 23 3 9A permits a maximum sentence
of fifteen years, if death is caused by the support provided, the maximum in-
creases to life imprisonment.3 ' Furthermore, under section 233 9 C, if financial
support is provided with the intent to fund an act of terrorism, the maximum
sentence is twenty years.3 - But if someone only conceals such financial support,
the maximum is reduced to ten years. 36 Contrary to these varying levels of
punishment, the minimum sentence under the Terrorism Enhancement is 17.5
years, regardless of the type of material support provided.3 ' Therefore, while
the material support statutes demonstrate that Congress indicated that sen-
tences should be "proportional to the culpability of the conduct, to the injury
that can be directly attributed to a defendant's actions, and to the nature of the
31. See George D. Brown, Notes on a Terrorism Trial-Preventive Prosecution, "Material Support"
and the Role of the judge After United States v. Mehanna, 4 HARv. NAT'L SECURITY J. 1, 54
(2012) ("[The Terrorism Enhancement does not reflect] an important value of the criminal
law: the gradation of offenses. We do not treat a purse-snatcher like a rapist. The Enhance-
ment reflects a different view: a terrorist is a terrorist."); James P. McLoughlin, Jr., Decon-
structing United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 3A1.4: Sentencing Failure in Cases of Finan-
cial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 28 LAw&INEQ. 51, 1oo, 116 (2010).
32. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60, 71 (2o1o); Christina Parajon Skinner, Punishing
Crimes of Terror in Article III Courts, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 309, 338-55 (2013).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 233 9 A (2012).
34. Id.
3s. Id. § 23 3 9 C(d)(1).
36. Id. § 23 3 9 C(d)(2).
37. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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organization's actions,"" the Terrorism Enhancement treats those who provide
any type of material support to a terrorist as harshly as the terrorist who com-
mits the violent act."
Others have recognized that the seriousness of terrorism offenses differs
based on the underlying conduct. Christina Parajon Skinner, for example, di-
vides offenders into "hard core" and "soft core" groups.40 Hard-core defendants
are those that have committed "terroristic acts or attempts, [when] there are no
mitigating circumstances to consider."4 1 As an example, Skinner provides Zaca-
rias Moussaoui, the "twentieth hijacker," who received a life sentence for his
role in the 9/11 attacks and never demonstrated remorse for his actions.42 For
these individuals, long sentences "are proportional to the threat they pose."43
On the other hand, soft-core defendants include individuals "whose conduct
has less directly threatened U.S. interests," such as those convicted of providing
material support or in sting operations initiated by government informants.'
One thing that many of these soft-core defendants have in common is that
their actions did not lead to any identifiable harm or imminent risk of harm. In
the regular sentencing context, the lack of actual harm usually reduces a de-
fendant's sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s instruction to con-
sider "the seriousness of the offense" as well as section 2X1.1(b)(1)-(2) of the
Guidelines, which provides for an offense-level reduction for uncompleted
crimes.45 However, for the Terrorism Enhancement, the fact that the defend-
ant's conduct caused no harm does not matter. For this reason, the Enhance-
ment treats individuals convicted after sting operations the same as those for
whom the government played no role in assisting with their planned attack.
Terrorism sentencing fails to take into account the fact that a defendant's in-
tent, knowledge, and capability of committing the crime is usually much lower
38. McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 68; see also id. at loo ("There are many meaningful distinc-
tions between defendants convicted of crimes of terrorism, including the 'materiality' of
their support, the intent with which they gave the support, the organization to which the
support was given, the quality and quantum of the support, the duration of the support, the
identifiable harm caused by the support, and any identifiable victim of the support. U.S.S.G.
section 3A1. 4 fails to account for these differences.").
39. See, e.g., id. at 58.
40. Skinner, supra note 32, at 349-57.
41. Id. at 349.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 350.
44. Id. at 351.
45. 18 U.S.C. 5 3553(a)(2)(A) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X1.1(b)(1)-(2)
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
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when an informant is involved. As Joshua Dratel states, " [I]t will always be un-
clear just what the defendant would have done - or not done - absent the solici-
tation, encouragement, and assistance of government operatives," and the de-
fendant "might not have presented a danger except in conjunction with a
confidential informant."" However, that defendant receives the same punitive
sentencing enhancement as a hardened terrorist.
The Terrorism Enhancement also does not take into account the individual
characteristics of each defendant. The young American Muslims analyzed in
this Feature all have little to no criminal history, and but for the Terrorism En-
hancement would have been placed in Category I instead of VI, which could
have reduced their potential Guidelines sentence by fifteen years or more.4 7
The Sentencing Commission has recognized that individuals with no criminal
record have the lowest rate of recidivism. One study determined that 93.2% of
first-time offenders did not recidivate.1 In other situations for defendants with
no criminal history, courts have given sentences below the advisory Guidelines
range, recognizing that a lesser term of incarceration is still a substantial pun-
ishment and deterrent for someone who has never experienced prison before. 4 9
However, such considerations do not apply for most terrorism defendants.so
46. Dratel, supra note ii, at 61.
47. For example, the Guidelines range for an individual with an offense level of thirty-six would
be reduced from 324-405 months to 188-235 months. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ SA, sentencing tbl. (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
48. Recidivism and the "First Offender," U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION 26 (May 2004), http://www.us
sc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2004/20040
5_Recidivism FirstOffender.pdf [http://perma.cc/MLD8-RQU8].
49. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 479 F. Supp. 2d 927, 937 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (varying down-
wards because the "sentence provided a substantial punishment for someone like [Willis],
who had never before been to jail and who engaged in no violence"); United States v.
McGee, 479 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912 (E.D. Wis. 2007) (giving a below-Guidelines sentence be-
cause defendant "had never before been to prison" and "[g]enerally, a lesser period of im-
prisonment is required to deter a defendant not previously subject to lengthy incarceration
than is necessary to deter a defendant who has already served serious time yet continues to
re-offend" (quoting United States v. Qualls, 373 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877 (E.D. Wis. 2005))).
50. Some have argued that, despite the Terrorism Enhancement, federal judges can still take in-
to account the circumstances of the offense and defendant in sentencing because, post-
Booker, they have the discretion to vary or depart downward where the individual circum-
stances do not match those of a dangerous terrorist. Indeed, the Sentencing Guidelines
themselves permit a downward departure "[i]f reliable information indicates that the de-
fendant's criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the de-
fendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other
crimes...." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4 A1. 3 (b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2015). In some terrorism cases, district courts have departed downward on that ba-
sis. For example, in United States v. Aref, the district court found that a departure to criminal
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B. War on Drugs
Decades before the federal government established policies like the Terror-
ism Enhancement as part of the War on Terror, it created a series of laws to en-
sure that those convicted of drug crimes received lengthy jail time as part of the
War on Drugs. And, just like the War on Terror, the War on Drugs' sentencing
policies failed to take into account the nature of the offense and individual cir-
cumstances of the defendant. Instead, the policies required lengthy sentences
for a broad range of conduct, including low-level drug offenses that were not
tied to the violent gang activity that the policies were intended to address.
The beginning of the War on Drugs is often attributed to President Nixon,
who in 1971 decried drug abuse as "public enemy number one" and later creat-
ed the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, the precursor to the Drug En-
forcement Administration.-' In the 198os and 199os, the crack-cocaine epi-
demic and inner-city gang violence led Congress to adopt harsh consequences
for drug offenders.52 Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986, which
created twenty-nine mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses. 3 The
law also created a one hundred-to-one sentencing disparity for crack versus
powder cocaine, in which a person required only five grams of crack cocaine (as
opposed to 5oo grams of powder cocaine) to trigger a five-year mandatory
minimum.5 4 Additionally, to address what President Clinton characterized as
the "[g]angs and drugs [that] have taken over our streets and undermined our
schools,"" Congress enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
history Category I was warranted because the defendant "has provided for his family until
his arrest through lawful employment in various capacities, and there is no indication that
he has engaged in any other criminal activity." United States v. Aref, No. 04-CR-4o2, 2007
WL 804814, at *3 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 14, 2007). The problem with this argument is that cases
like Aref are the exception to the rule, and, as Wadie Said points out, appellate courts have
consistently overturned sentences for terrorism defendants when judges vary downward too
significantly from the Guidelines range created by the Terrorism Enhancement. Wadie E.
Said, Sentencing Terrorist Crimes, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 477, 525-27 (2014).
51. President Richard Nixon, Statement on Establishing the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement,
Am. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 28, 1972), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/pid=3 552[http://perma.cc/R778-EHGB].
52. Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black Males in America, 15
J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 281, 290-91 (2012).
53. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 1oo Stat. 3207.
54. Id. § 1302.
ss. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
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Act of 1994.56 The Act created a federal "three strikes" provision establishing a
mandatory life sentence for individuals convicted of a "serious violent felony" if
they had two or more prior convictions, at least one of which was a "serious vi-
olent felony," and the other of which was either a "serious violent felony" or a
"serious drug offense.""
The Guidelines range for drug crimes increased significantly as well. For
example, a first-time offender who was convicted of distributing 500 grams of
methamphetamine would receive between ten to twelve years in prison, higher
than for "forcible rape, killing a person in voluntary manslaughter, disclosing
top secret information, and violent extortion of more than $5 million involving
serious bodily injury."" The Sentencing Commission also created the Career
Offender Guideline, which established a much higher Guidelines range for in-
dividuals convicted of a "controlled substance offense" or "crime of violence"
with at least two prior felony convictions of either a "controlled substance
offense" or "crime of violence.""
Similar to the War on Terror sentencing policies, many of these laws re-
stricted a judge's ability to consider the seriousness of the criminal conduct and
circumstances of the individual defendant when formulating a sentence. In-
deed, a primary reason Congress created high mandatory sentences in the War
on Drugs was to take away the discretion that judges had previously used to
assess the individual characteristics of each defendant, for fear that the judges
were imposing lenient sentences that failed to sufficiently protect the public.60
And, just like the terrorism context, drug sentencing policies not only applied
to violent and hardened offenders, but also a broad range of nonviolent offend-
ers. For example, the Career Offender Guideline defines "crime of violence"
and "controlled substance offense" broadly, and like the Terrorism Enhance-
ment, automatically increases a defendant's criminal history category to VI, re-
56. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1o8 Stat. 1796.
57. Memorandum from Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to All U.S. Attorneys (Mar. 13, 1995), http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource
-manual-'032-sentencing-enhancement-three-strikes-law [http://perma.cc/23HC-YSR8].
58. An Offer You Can't Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants To Plead Guilty,
HUM. RTs. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013) [hereinafter An Offer You Can't Refuse], http://www
.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug
-defendants-plead [http://perma.cc/VL4A-VW8Q].
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §5 4B1.1, 4B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
6o. James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Ter-
ror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 331, 359-60 (2009); Aziz Z. Huq & Christo-
pher Muller, The War on Crime as Precursor to the War on Terror, 36 INT'L J.L. CuIME & JUST.
215, 218-19 (2008).
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gardless of his actual criminal history.61 Therefore, a typical defendant receiv-
ing a lengthy sentence pursuant to this Guideline has been a low-level, nonvio-
lent drug offender whose previous convictions were for "crimes of violence"
that did not involve any actual violent conduct and minor drug offenses.62
II. JUSTIFYING LENGTHY SENTENCES IN THE WARS ON TERROR
AND DRUGS
Although neither the terrorism nor the drug sentencing laws discussed
above explicitly targeted one specific religious, ethnic, or racial group, both the
Wars on Terror and Drugs have disproportionately affected particular segments
of the American public: Muslims and African Americans, respectively. With the
War on Terror, even though Muslims do not commit acts of terrorism in the
United States at higher levels than other communities,63 Muslims are dispro-
portionately targeted by. government counterterrorism policies.6 ' The reason is
obvious. The primary focus of the War on Terror has not been to eliminate all
forms of terrorism, but rather to combat violent attacks from Al Qaeda -the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks - and like-minded groups such as ISIS.65 Simi-
larly, with the War on Drugs, even though they were no more likely than
whites to use or sell illegal drugs,66 African Americans were far more likely to
61. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 411.1, 4B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
62. Amy Baron-Evans et al., Deconstructing the Career Offender Guideline, 2 CHARLOTTE L. REv.
39, 85 (2010).
63. CHARLES KURZMAN, MUSLIM-AMERICAN TERRORISM IN 2014 2-3 (2015); Non-Muslims Car-
ried Out More than 9o% of All Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Soil, WASHINGTON'S BLOG (May
1, 2013), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2o13/05/muslims-only-carried-out-2-5-per
cent-of-terrorist-attacks-on-u-s-soil-between-1970-and-2012.html [http://perma.cc/RQN4
-LSLA] (noting that only 2.5% of all terrorist attacks on U.S. soil between 1970 and 2012
were carried out by Muslims).
64. Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the
Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 419, 423 (2011) ("Post-9/11
changes to policing strategies have been primarily targeted towards Muslim, South Asian
and Arab Americans." (citations omitted)); id. ("Terrorism-related criminal investigations
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation[] and local law enforcement focus disproportionately
on mosques and Muslim civic organizations." (citations omitted)).
65. See National Strategy for Counterterrorism, WHITE HOUSE 3 (2011), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism-strategy.pdf [http://perma.cc/6BA4-L343] ("The
preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qa'ida and its affili-
ates and adherents." (emphasis and footnote omitted)); see also id. at 10-17 (describing the
areas of focus of U.S. counterterrorism strategy).
66. See Rothwell, supra note 3.
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be arrested for drug crimes, and received much stiffer sentences.67 This too was
based on government objectives not to focus on all drug crimes, but rather
primarily those that were tied to gang violence in predominantly African Amer-
68ican communities.
Interestingly, when justifying the application of these stringent sentencing
policies to young American Muslims and African Americans, policymakers and
commentators have used notably similar reasons: these dangerous individuals
are uniquely incapable of being rehabilitated and deterred in the short-term
and must be incapacitated with lengthy terms of incarceration. And, in both
cases, these justifications are unsupported. Instead, the punishment given to
many American Muslims and African Americans has been much "greater than
necessary" to achieve the purposes of federal sentencing.69.
A. War on Terror
1. Justification for Terrorism Sentencing
As explained above, unlike in other contexts, terrorism sentencing fails to
sufficiently address how much harm the defendant has caused, and instead the
Terrorism Enhancement creates lengthy sentences for a broad range of con-
duct. 70 Legislators and courts have justified adopting these long sentences
based on their view that terrorism as an offense, and terrorists as individuals,
are uniquely situated among all crimes and criminals, which supports funda-
mentally altering the sentencing process.
When Congress requested that the Sentencing Commission enact the Ter-
rorism Enhancement in 1994, the Commission had initially expressed reserva-
tions because the proposed adjustment would not take into account the fact
that "defendants who share a common terrorist objective may vary greatly in
terms of the threat to persons and national security that they realistically
67. Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs, HUM. RTs. WATCH (May
2000) [hereinafter Punishment and Prejudice], http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2ooo/usa
/Rcedrgoo-o4.htm [http://perma.cc/JB4C-EUQP].
68. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
(1995); Moriearty & Carson, supra note 52, at 290; Punishment and Prejudice, supra note 67.
69. Contra 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) ("The court shall impose a sentence ... not greater than
necessary. . . .").
70. Said, supra note So, at 527 (noting that "modern terrorism prosecution now relies largely on
material support charges unconnected to any violence and inchoate criminal activity not
likely to result in actual violence").
1535
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
pose."" In response, the Chair of the Attorney General's Subcommittee on Sen-
tencing Guidelines disregarded the Commission's nuanced view of terrorism
offenses and instead urged the Commission to enact the Enhancement "in or-
der to combat this serious threat to public safety." 72 For this reason, as Second
Circuit Judge Walker explains, the Terrorism Enhancement "reflects Congress'
[sic] and the Commission's policy judgment that an act of terrorism represents
a particularly grave threat because of the dangerousness of the crime and the
difficulty of deterring and rehabilitating the criminal, and thus that terrorists
and their supporters should be incapacitated for a longer period of time" than
other criminals.7 1 Courts have thus justified applying the Terrorism Enhance-
ment by stating that "terrorists[,] [even those] with no prior criminal behav-
ior[,] are unique among criminals in the likelihood of recidivism, the difficulty
of rehabilitation, and the need for incapacitation."7 ' As Wadie Said notes, this
belief "that terrorism is different, maybe even exceptional" is premised on "a
type of visceral outrage at all conduct linked to terrorists that can taint the indi-
vidualized and careful.process that is supposed to go into a criminal sentenc-
ing" and "justifies a departure from the normal standards."7
The idea that those convicted of terrorism offenses cannot be rehabilitated
or deterred stems from the belief that, unlike other criminal conduct, the pri-
mary motivation of terrorism is ideological. Indeed, when urging Congress to
pass the USA PATRIOT Act-legislation that expanded both the Terrorism
71. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANALYSIS OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAw ENFORCE-
MENT ACT OF 1994: PART II, at 13 (1994).
72. Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Concerning Proposed Sentencing Guideline Amend-
ments 20 (Mar. 14, 1995) (statement of Jay P. McClosky, U.S. Attorney, District of Maine &
Chairman, Subcommittee on Sentencing Guidelines, Att'y Gen.'s Advisory Comm. of U.S.
Attorneys, & Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Criminal Division); see also United
States v. Stewart, 590 F.3 d 93, 172 (2d Cir. 2009) (Walker, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("Congress expressly mandated that the Sentencing Commission provide for a
terrorism enhancement to ensure that crimes of terrorism were met with a punishment that
reflects their extraordinary seriousness.").
73. Stewart, 590 F.3d at 172-73 (Walker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
and quotations omitted).
74. United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1117 (n1th Cir. 2011); United States v. Meskini, 319
F.3 d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Said, supra note So, at 481 ("At the heart of [terrorism sen-
tencing case law] lies a message that terrorism is especially heinous, and those convicted of
terrorist crimes are particularly dangerous to the point of being irredeemably incapable of
deterrence.").
75. Said, supra note 50, at 521, 525; see also Dratel, supra note II, at S8 (noting that federal sen-
tencing law fails to take into account that "not all terrorism cases are alike, not all terrorism
defendants are alike, and the difference in treatment would reflect a difference in threat level
presented by the defendant, as well as the individual's capacity for rehabilitation").
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Enhancement and material support laws -Attorney General John Ashcroft de-
scribed terrorists as "savage," "freedom's enemies, murderers of innocents in
the name of a barbarous cause," who are "undeterred by the threat of criminal
sanctions" and "willing to sacrifice the lives of their members in order to take
the lives of innocent citizens of free nations."7 6 And, at the USA PATRIOT Act's
signing ceremony, President George W. Bush added that the law "will help
counter a threat like no other our nation has ever faced . . .. They recognize no
barrier of morality; they have no conscience. The terrorists cannot be reasoned
with."" Pursuant to this argument, terrorists must be incapacitated and de-
tained for extraordinarily long periods of time so they do not return to sup-
porting their violent ideological goals."
2. Sentencing Young, Nonviolent American Muslims
Because federal terrorism sentencing laws do not adequately take into ac-
count the severity of the offense or the characteristics of the individual, the
premise that those who commit terrorist crimes cannot be deterred or rehabili-
tated is then applied to the many young, nonviolent American Muslims con-
victed of terrorism-related offenses since 9/11. These individuals have little to
no criminal history (particularly no crimes of violence), were convicted of ter-
rorism offenses that caused no actual harm to others, and became subject to
government scrutiny because they had expressed extreme views either con-
sistent with or in support of foreign terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and
ISIS. In this category, I exclude individuals who have attempted to commit ac-
tual violent acts and failed to do so only because of happenstance or law en-
forcement intervention. However, I do include Muslims whose proposed at-
tacks were doomed to fail from the beginning because they were instigated by
government informants. In informant cases, it is unclear if the defendants ever
would have attempted any violent acts but for the informants' involvement.
Young, nonviolent American Muslims make up the majority of the approx-
imately 400 individuals charged with crimes connected to Al Qaeda and related
76. Expanding Terrorism, Investigation, Prosecution: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciaty,
107th Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States), 2001 WL
1132414.
77. Bush Signs Anti-Terrorism Legislation, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2001), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushtext_102601.html [http://
perma.cc/U6LC-8EG4].
78. See Skinner, supra note 32, at 349-50.
79. Dratel, supra note ii, at 61.
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terrorist groups since 9/11." Since the designation of ISIS as a terrorist organi-
zation in 2014, there has been an increased focus on arresting, detaining, and
charging these individuals with terrorism crimes.8 ' Federal prosecutors have
charged over 1o6 individuals in connection with ISIS and have convicted
fifty.8 2 The majority arrested for ISIS-related activity have also been young,
nonviolent American Muslims: their average age is twenty-six; ninety percent
are U.S. citizens or permanent residents; seventy-three percent were not in-
volved in plotting terrorist attacks in the United States; fifty-five percent were
arrested after interacting with government informants; and most were charged
8o. While the exact figure of young, nonviolent American Muslims charged with crimes con-
nected to terrorist groups remains unavailable, the available data demonstrates that they
make up the majority of post-9/11 cases. For example, New America has identified 381 indi-
viduals since 9/11 who have been "charged with or died engaging in jihadist terrorism or re-
lated activities inside the United States, and Americans accused of such activity abroad." Pe-
ter Bergen et al., Terrorism in America After 9/11, Part I. Terrorism Cases: 2ool-Today, NEW
Am. (Sept. 7, 2016) http://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/part-i
-overview-terrorism-cases-20oo-today [http://perma.cc/P8QE-U8L9]; see also By the Num-
bers, supra note 5 (identifying 368 U.S. prosecutions from 2001 to 2013 of "terror activity as-
sociated with groups such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates or inspired by global jihadism"). Of
those individuals, at least eighty-one percent were U.S. citizens or permanent residents,
eighty-eight percent had never served time in prison, forty-eight percent were monitored by
a government informant, and their average age was twenty-nine. Peter Bergen et al., Terror-
ism in America After 9/11, Part II. Who Are the Terrorists?, NEw AM. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://
www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists [http://perma.cc
/EX5W-M9GL]; Peter Bergen et al., Terrorism in America After 9/11, Part III. Why Do They
Engage In Terrorism?, NEW AM. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.newamerica.org/in
-depth/terrorism-in-america/why-do-they-commit-terrorist-acts [http://perma.cc/2QMA
-5AK2]; Peter Bergen et al., Terrorism in America After 9/11, Part IV What Is the Threat to the
United States Today?, NEW AM. (Sept. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Bergen et al., Terrorism in America
After 9/11, Part IV], http://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what
-threat-united-states-today [http://perma.cc/2CP5-KH72]. Other data demonstrate that the
majority of these terrorism offenses were not for committing violent acts, but rather nonvio-
lent conduct, including providing material support, making false statements to law en-
forcement, and informant-based plots. See, e.g., Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 2, 21, 201-
02; Lorenzo Vidino & Seamus Hughes, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa, GEo. WASH.
PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM 7-8 (Dec. 2015), http://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files
/downloads/ISIS%20in%2oAmerica%20-%2oFull%2oReport.o.pdf [http://perma.cc/J88Y
-DG7J].
81. Janet Reitman, The Children of ISIS, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.rolling
stone.com/culture/features/teenage-jihad-inside-the-world-of-american-kids-seduced-by-i
sis-20150325 [http://perma.cc/T23T-ZAG7].
82. Adam Goldman et al., The Islamic State's Suspected Inroads into America, WASH. POST
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with material support offenses, such as traveling, or attempting to travel,
abroad to join ISIS."
These young American Muslims largely fit into the following three catego-
ries: those convicted of (1) material support offenses, (2) taking part in a plot
assisted by government informants, and (3) making false statements to gov-
ernment officials. For each category, I present two case studies that provide
concrete examples of how federal courts have given these individuals lengthy
sentences despite their young age, lack of actual harm committed, negligible
criminal history, expressions of remorse, and other mitigating factors. As the
case studies show, for the most part, courts have applied the Terrorism En-
hancement, leading to a significant Guidelines range and ultimate sentence.
a. Material Support Offenses
The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 23 3 9 B, have allowed
the government to prosecute young American Muslims for a broad range of
conduct. Section 233 9A prohibits the provision of "material support or re-
sources" while "knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation
for, or in carrying out'" enumerated terrorism crimes.8 4 Section 2339B prohibits
"knowingly provid[ing] material support or resources" to an organization that
has been designated as a "foreign terrorist organization" by the Secretary of
State.8 - Therefore, unlike section 2339A, where the provision of material sup-
port must be tied to an actual crime, section 23 39 B criminalizes any support
given to a designated foreign terrorist organization, even if the support was in-
tended for peaceful purposes. "Material support" includes any tangible or in-
tangible property or service, such as training, expert advice, or assistance.8 6
The material support statutes have allowed the government to convict
young American Muslims for a variety of nonviolent conduct that is only tan-
gentially related to terrorist activity, including translating and publishing ex-
tremist materials online as well as storing clothing for an alleged terrorist.
Once convicted, the Sentencing Guidelines - especially the Terrorism En-
83. Vidino & Hughes, supra note 8o, at 5-8; see also Goldman et al., supra note 82 (reporting an
average age of twenty-seven).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2012).
8S. Id. § 2339B(a)(1).
86. Skinner, supra note 32, at 330 n.117; Illusion of fustice, supra note 28, at 6o-6i; see also Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010) (finding that material support includes
training on how to use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve disputes).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (ist Cir. 2013); United States v. Hashmi,
621 F. Supp. 2d 76, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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hancement -leads these individuals to receive lengthy sentences. For example,
a defendant convicted under section 2339B would be subject to a Guidelines
range of thirty years to life. Although the statutory maximum is only twenty
years for each count, prosecutors can charge individuals with multiple counts
to reach the recommended Guidelines range."
The material support statutes are two of the more widely used tools in the
War on Terror. One study found the largest share of convictions in terrorism
cases since 9/11 was for material support offenses."9 Below are two examples of
young American Muslims who have received long sentences based on the mate-
rial support statutes.
i. Shelton Bell
Shelton Bell was a high school dropout when he began viewing online vid-
eos from extremist Anwar al-Awlaki. 90 When Bell was eighteen, he and a friend
traveled to the Middle East to join a terrorist organization.91 Their plans were
foiled when they were detained by authorities in Jordan and returned to the
United States. 92 Bell pleaded guilty to conspiracy and attempt to provide mate-
rial support to terrorists.
At sentencing, the judge applied the Terrorism Enhancement." Although
Bell's only prior criminal offenses were a trespass conviction and a violation of a
temporary injunction barring contact with his mother's boyfriend, the En-
hancement placed him in the highest criminal history category.95 Bell's Guide-
lines range was life imprisonment. However, because the statutory maximum
88. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5Gi.i(a), 5 G1.2(d) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2015); United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3 d 65, 113 (2d Cir. 2006); see also McLoughlin, supra
note 31, at 89 ("[A] defendant who is convicted of a single material support charge and a se-
ries of minor related or unrelated offenses can face a sentence dramatically greater than the
statutory maximum. The greater sentence is ... the result of the fact that the minor unrelat-
ed charges can add fuel to U.S.S.G. section 3A1.4.").
89. Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 62-63.
go. United States v. Bell, 81 F. Supp. 3 d 1301, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2015); Derek Kinner & Tamara
Lush, Associated Press, Fla. Mosque Leaders Say Teen Talked of Jihad, YAHOO! NEWS
(July 19, 2013), http://www.yahoo.com/news/fla-mosque-leaders-teen-talked-jihad-152931
55o.html [http://perma.cc/4J3J-YFJR].
91. Bell, 81 F. Supp. 3 d at 1306.
92. Id. at 1309.
93. Id. at 1305.
94. Id. at 1311-12.
95. Id. at 1315-16, 1318.
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was fifteen years for each count, the maximum sentence that Bell could have
received was thirty years.96 Bell's attorney argued that he did not commit any
terrorist acts, nor did he have the funds or connections to help terrorist organi-
zations.97 Bell added that "he made a grievous, immature mistake, and that he
no longer subscribes to al-Awlaki's hate-filled agenda. He expresses remorse to
his family, his friends, his fellow Muslims, and the Court, stating that his goal
now is to be a productive citizen, raise a family, get an MBA, and even study
terrorism and how to combat it."" The government rejected Bell's apology, ar-
guing he was a terrorist who "poses a likelihood of recidivism, no meaningful
chance of rehabilitation, and . .. a heightened risk of dangerousness." 99 Bell
was sentenced to twenty years.'oo
ii. Ali Shukri Amin
Ali Shukri Amin was a high school honor student who used Twitter to post
thousands of messages in support of ISIS, including instructions on how to
make anonymous donations. to ISIS and on how to travel to Syria to join
ISIS."o' Amin also helped his friend travel to Syria in January 2015.102 Amin
was subsequently arrested by the FBI and pleaded guilty to conspiring to pro-
vide material support to ISIS.
At sentencing, the government argued that Amin should receive the statu-
tory maximum of fifteen years based on the "harm that the defendant has
caused to this community, the scope of his conduct, and the danger he will con-
96. Id. at 1316.
97. Larry Hannan, Jacksonville Man Gets 20 Years in Prison on Terrorism Charges, FLA. TIMES-
UNION (Jan. 15, 2015, 5:46 AM), http://jacksonville.com/news/crime/2015-o-14/story
/jacksonville-man-gets-2o-years-prison-terrorism-charges [http://perma.cc/BYR9-8P7Y].
98. Bell, 81 F. Supp. 3 d at 1304.
99. Id. at 1319.
lo. Id. at 1325-26.
101. Yasmeen Abutaleb & Kristina Cooke, Extremists Among Us: A Teen's Turn to Radicalism and
the U.S. Safety Net that Failed To Stop It, REUTERS (June 6, 2016, 2:20 P.M.), http://
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-extremists-teen/ [http://perma.cc/5HP3
-PTRB]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Virginia Man Sentenced to More Than 11 Years
for Providing Material Support to ISIL (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/virginia-man-sentenced-more-11-years-providing-material-support-isil [http://perma.cc
/DE8A-PGPE].
1o2. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note ioi.
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tinue to pose to society."os Amin's attorney requested six years, noting Amin's
young age and lack of criminal record. Amin apologized for his support for
ISIS, stating that he "became lost and caught up in something that takes the
greatest and most profound teachings of Islam and turns them into justifica-
tions for violence and death."' Amin added that his online acquaintances
"treated me with respect and occasionally reverence. For the first time I was not
only being taken seriously about a very important and weighty topics [sic], but
was actually being asked for guidance."0 5 Amin was sentenced to eleven
years. 106
b. Informant Plots
Another major counterterrorism policy has been the use of government in-
formants. Nearly fifty percent of federal terrorism convictions since 9/11 have
been based on information obtained from informants. 0o Approximately thirty
percent were sting operations in which an FBI informant "was directly involved
in proposing, crafting, facilitating, and inducing a terrorist plot."0 s
The government's aggressive use of sting operations has been criticized for
targeting individuals who may never have taken part in terrorist activities but
for the informants' intervention.10' The FBI has targeted young Muslims with
103. Paula Reid, Teenage Terror Suspect Ali Shukri Amin Faces Sentencing, CBS NEWS (Aug.
27, 2015, 6:41 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/teenage-terror-suspect-ali-shukri-amin
-faces-sentencing [http://perma.cc/7XEW-Y86S] (quoting federal prosecutors).
104. Id. (quoting Amin).
105. Id. (quoting Amin).
106. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note loi.
107. Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 2.
108. Id. at 2; see also Amna Akbar, National Security's Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REv. 834, 855
(2015) (finding that "all but four of the last decade's high-profile terrorism prosecutions
resulted from FBI sting operations"); Trevor Aaronson, The Informants, MOTHER
JONES (Sept. 2011), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/20ii/o8/fbi-terrorist-informants
[http://perma.cC/2C39-Y3BJ] (finding that 158 out of 5o8 convictions involved a sting oper-
ation).
iog. Paul Harris, Fake Terror Plots, Paid Informants: The Tactics of FBI 'Entrapment' Questioned,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2on1/nov/16/fbi-entrap
ment-fake-terror-plots [http://perma.cc/U79P-D6SY] ("Critics say the FBI is running a
sting operation across America, targeting- to a large extent- the Muslim community by lur-
ing people into fake terror plots."); Eric Schmitt, U.S. Is Trying To Counter ISIS' Efforts To
Lure Alienated Young Muslims, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/10/05/us/us-is-trying-to-counter-isiss-efforts-to-lure-alienated-young-muslims.html
[http://perma.cc/HVP7-AC7U] (reporting that Muslims at an Ohio mosque had "com-
plained of . .. F.B.I. sting operations that wrongly targeted Muslim citizens as terrorists").
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extremist views, "who ha[ve] shown no signs of mastering basic life functions,
let alone carrying out a serious terror attack, and ha[ve] no known involvement
with actual terrorist groups."no Sometimes, the FBI designs the attack plan,
and the informant convinces the target to carry it out."' Despite the inform-
ant's large role in the crime, Muslims charged in these plots rarely avoid crimi-
nal liability by raising the entrapment defense, the primary way the American
legal system regulates sting operations." 2 For an entrapment defense to suc-
ceed, two elements must be established: (i) the government "induced" the de-
fendant to commit the crime, and (2) the defendant was not independently
"predisposed" to commit the crime."' The predisposition element leads to the
introduction of character evidence," 4 which in terrorism cases includes the de-
fendant's extremist views and is usually enough for an American jury to con-
clude that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime."'s
Below are two examples of American Muslims who received long sentences
based on informant-led prosecutions.
i. James Cromitie
James Cromitie was an impoverished Muslim who expressed vitriolic anti-
Semitic views when he met an FBI informant at his mosque. The informant
constructed a plot in which Cromitie and three others would fire rocket-
propelled grenades at Stewart Air Base and place bombs at a New York syna-
gogue. After resisting the informant's advances for months, Cromitie agreed to
take part in the plot when the informant offered him $250,ooo."' Cromitie
was arrested while planting phony explosive devices given to him by the in-
formant. At trial, Cromitie was convicted of conspiracy and attempt to use
weapons of mass destruction, and conspiracy and attempt to acquire and use
anti-aircraft missiles, among other charges. "7
110. Glenn Greenwald, Why Does the FBI Have To Manufacture Its Own Plots If Terrorism and ISIS
Are Such Grave Threats?, INTERCEPT (Feb. 26, 2015), http://theintercept.com/2o15/o2
/26/fbi-manufacture-plots-terrorism-isis-grave-threats [http://perma.cc/7PFU-QXXT].
in. Id.
112. Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REv. 125, 128 (20o8).
113. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1988).
114. See Stevenson, supra note 112, at 137.
lis. Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 57-58.
116. United States v. Cromitie, 727 F-3 d 194, 199-204 (2d Cir. 2013).
117. Id.
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Despite Cromitie's conviction, the judge stated after trial that Cromitie
"was incapable of committing an act of terrorism on his own," and that the FBI
"created acts of terrorism out of his fantasies of bravado and bigotry, and then
made those fantasies come true." 8 The judge nevertheless sentenced Cromitie
to twenty-five years. At sentencing, she explained that the Terrorism En-
hancement applied, that Cromitie's Guidelines range was life imprisonment,
and the anti-aircraft missile offenses carried a twenty-five-year mandatory min-
imum sentence." 9
ii. Rezwan Ferdaus
Rezwan Ferdaus, age twenty-five, lived in Massachusetts when he met an
FBI informant at his mosque.120 The informant not only introduced Ferdaus to
two FBI undercover agents pretending to be Al Qaeda terrorists, but also pro-
vided him with financial assistance for a plot to attack the Pentagon and U.S.
Capitol building using remote-controlled drone planes containing explosives
followed by a ground attack with automatic weapons."' While the plot was
unfolding, Ferdaus was suffering from mental and physical disabilities, includ-
ing depression, seizures, weight loss, and loss of bladder control."2 The FBI
agents also supplied Ferdaus with materials for the attack: grenades, machine
guns, explosives, and a remote-controlled plane.' 2 3
Ferdaus was subsequently arrested and charged with six counts, including
"attempting to damage and destroy a federal building ... by means of an ex-
plosive" and "attempting to provide material support to terrorists."'2 4 If he
were found guilty at trial, Ferdaus's Guidelines range would have been life im-
n18. Glenn Greenwald & Andrew Fishman, Latest FBI Claim of Disrupted Terror Plot Deserves
Much Scrutiny and Skepticism, INTERCEPT (Jan. 16, 2015), http://theintercept.com/2015
/oi/i6/latest-fbi-boast-disrupting-terror-u-s-plot-deserves-scrutiny-skepticism [http://
perma.cc/FPW4-ZGDV].
ig. United States v. Cromitie, No. o9 Cr. 558(CM), 2011 WL 2693297, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 29,
2011).
i2o. Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 32-33; Rezwan Ferdaus Held Over Pentagon and Capitol
Bomb Plot, BBC NEws (Sept. 29, 2011) [hereinafter Rezwan Ferdaus Held], http://www.bbc
.com/news/world-us-canada-151o1449 [http://perma.cc/UX6U-4CZE].
121. Illusion offustice, supra note 28, at 32-33.
122. Id. at 33-34.
123. Rezwan Ferdaus Held, supra note 120.
124. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Ferdaus, 2011 WL 5909547 (D. Mass. Nov. 28, 2011)
(No. 11-10331-RGS), 2012 WL 3151234.
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prisonment, due in part to the application of the Terrorism Enhancement.'2 5
Instead, Ferdaus entered into a plea agreement and agreed to a seventeen-year
sentence. 126
c. Making False Statements
The third way that young American Muslims have received lengthy sen-
tences for nonviolent terrorism-related conduct is by making false statements
to government officials. One common charge is violation of 18 U.S.C. 5 1ool,
which states that "in any matter within the jurisdiction" of the federal govern-
ment, it is prohibited to "knowingly and willfully" make "materially false . . . or
fraudulent statement[s]" or conceal information.1 2 1 While the maximum sen-
tence for most section lool violations is five years for each count, the maximum
increases to eight "if the offense involves international or domestic terror-
ism"1 2 ' However, because each false statement can be considered a separate
"count,"29 defendants in terrorism cases can be charged with multiple counts,
and their sentences can exceed eight years.' Other related charges include 18
U.S.C. § 1623, for making false material declarations to a grand jury, and 18
U.S.C. § 1503, for obstructing justice on account of making false statements.'
In one analysis of hundreds of terrorism cases, the third highest share of con-
victions was for making false statements.132 in recent years, young American
Muslims have been charged under section lool when statements made during
FBI interviews were inconsistent with their social media activity.' 33 Below are
125. Plea Hearing at 13, United States v. Ferdaus, 2011 WL 5909547 (D. Mass. Nov. 28, 2011)
(No. 11-103 31-RGS).
126. Id. at 15-17.
127. 18 U.S.C. § ioot(a) (2012).
128. Id.
129. U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Criminal Resource Manual Section 919: Multiplicity, Duplicity, Single
Document Policy, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource
-manual-91 9 -multiplicity-duplicity-single-document-policy [http://perma.cc/CP7X-X5kY
("A defendant violates 18 U.S.C. § iool each time a false statement is made.").
130. See, e.g., Trial Order at 2-3, United States v. Hayat, 2007 WL 1454280 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25,
2007) (No. 2:05CRo0240-01), 2007 WL 4915489.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012); id. § 1503.
132. Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 63 n.247, 202.
133. For example, Hamza Ahmed was indicted for lying about his travel plans and telling the FBI
"he knew someone who had traveled to Syria ... only 'vaguely' from high school," when he
had tweeted "Lol my bro I love you" at the individual. Ryan J. Reilly, FBI: When It Comes to
@ISIS Terror, Retweets = Endorsements, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www
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two examples of Muslims who have received long sentences for making false
statements.
i. Sabri Benkahla
Sabri Benkahla, a twenty-seven-year-old college graduate, had been acquit-
ted of charges of providing services to the Taliban during a trip to Afghani-
stan. " He subsequently was subpoenaed to testify before two grand juries re-
garding his activities in Afghanistan and was questioned by the FBI."s Finding
Benkahla's answers untrustworthy, the government charged him with making
false declarations to the grand juries, making false statements to the FBI, and
obstructing justice. Benkahla was convicted on all those counts.136
At sentencing, the parties disputed whether the Terrorism Enhancement
should apply. Because Benkahla had no criminal history, without the En-
hancement, his Guidelines range would have only been thirty-three to forty-
one months. With the Enhancement, his range jumped to 210 to 262
months."' The judge held that the Enhancement applied because Benkahla's
conduct concerned "federal crimes of terrorism" and had impeded the govern-
ment's investigation into potential terrorist activity."' However, the judge also
stated that "Sabri Benkahla is not a terrorist," that he "has not committed any
other criminal acts," and that "his likelihood of doing so upon release is 'infini-
tesimal."' Therefore, the court varied downward and sentenced Benkahla to
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/twitter-terrorism-fbi-us_ 55b 7e25de4bo224 d88 34 466e [http://
perma.cc/S2DW-YA 3S]. Bilal Abood was arrested for telling the FBI that he had not
pledged obedience to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi even though he had done so on
Twitter. Id. And, Arafat Nagi was arrested for making statements to the FBI "that were 'in-
consistent with his statements [in support of ISIS] on the Twitter account that has been
linked to him."' Id. For a longer list of defendants charged with supporting ISIS, see Gold-
man et al., supra note 82.
134. See United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 304, 307 (4 th Cir. 2008); Steven A. Book, Unit-
ed States v. Benkahla: Illustrating The Need For Reform -The Fourth Circuit's Unprecedented
Application of the United States Sentencing Guideline Terrorism Enhancement to an Obstruction of
justice Conviction, 68 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 61, 62 (2009); Benkahla v. Federal Bureau
of Prisons, et al., ACLU (June 2, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/cases/benkahla-v-federal
-bureau-prisons-et-al [http://perma.cc/ZZD 4 -UT86].
135. 530 F.3d at 304.
136. Id. at 305.
137. Id.; United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 759 (E.D. Va. 2007).
138. 530 F-3 d at 305.
i39. Id. at 306 (quoting Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 759).
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121 months, still four times longer than what he would have received but for
the Terrorism Enhancement.140
ii. Abdel Hameed Shehadeh
Abdel Hameed Shehadeh was a teenager when he became subject to gov-
ernment surveillance due to extremist websites that he ran.141 He attempted to
travel to Pakistan and told U.S. officials that he was planning on visiting a reli-
gious school. However, the government believed Shehadeh wanted to join the
Taliban.142 Shehadeh was convicted of three counts of making false statements
to federal agents."
At sentencing, the judge ruled that the Terrorism Enhancement did not ap-
ply because Shehadeh's "deception and lies" did not "'promot[e]' the commis-
sion of" a federal terrorism offense.' 4 4 Because of Shehadeh's lack of criminal
history, his Guidelines range was only sixty-three to seventy-eight months.' 5
However, the judge applied a significant upward variance and sentenced
Shehadeh to 156 months.14 6 The judge stated that "[w] hile Shehadeh displayed
a significant level of immaturity and ineptness throughout the course of his
criminal conduct, there is no question that his conduct was extremely serious
and warrants a substantial period of incarceration." 4 7 Thus, even in cases
where the Terrorism Enhancement is not applicable, defendants have still re-
ceived very long sentences simply because their conduct could potentially relate
to terrorist activity.
3. Terrorism Sentencing Is Based on an Unsupported Premise
Many of these lengthy sentences given to young Muslims could be justified
if the basic premise of terrorism sentencing were correct: that all individuals
140. Id.
141. Mosi Secret, Staten Island Man Is Convicted of Lying About Plans To join Terrorists, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/o3/26/nyregion/staten-island-man
-convicted-of-lying-about-plans-to-join-terrorists.html [http://perma.cc/SUMW-D7NP].
142. Id.
143. United States v. Shehadeh, 586 F. App'x 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2014).
144. United States v. Shehadeh, No. 1:10-CR-1020(ENV), 2013 WL 6049001, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 14, 2013).
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *4.
147. Id.
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who commit terrorism-related offenses are uniquely incapable of being de-
terred and rehabilitated such that a special rule is necessary. However, this
premise is unsupported and leads to high sentences that are not connected to
the characteristics of the offense or the individual defendant, the actual deter-
rent value, or the ability of the defendant to be rehabilitated. 14
a. Ideology Is Not the Primary Motivation for Many Who Commit
Terrorism Offenses
As explained above, one reason policymakers have provided for why indi-
viduals who commit terrorism offenses cannot be deterred or rehabilitated is
that their criminal activity is ideologically motivated."' However, that assump-
tion is unsupported. Despite years of analysis, social scientists and policy ana-
lysts have no clear answer as to what leads people to support and commit vio-
lent acts on behalf of terrorist groups like ISIS."so While most agree that there
is no single profile of why one chooses to participate in terrorist activity,1s' po-
tential factors include political grievances, mental illness, economic stress,
trauma, and a sense of belonging, adventure, and notoriety.' 52 What is clear is
148. Dratel, supra note ii, at 57.
149. See supra Section II.A.i.
150. See, e.g., QUINTAN WIKTOROWICz, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST
11-17 (2005) (summarizing the different theories on why individuals become terrorists);
Matt Apuzzo, Who Will Become a Terrorist? Research Yields Few Clues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2ol6/03/28/world/europe/mystery-about-who-will-be
come-a-terrorist-defies-clear-answers.html [http://perma.cc/7QYF-56A8] ("Despite mil-
lions of dollars of government-sponsored research, and a much-publicized White House
pledge to find answers, there is still nothing close to a consensus on why someone becomes
a terrorist.").
151. Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARv. NAT'L SECURITY J. 147, 166 (2014)
(recognizing the "general consensus that there is no profile or single path of 'radicalization'
towards violence"); Apuzzo, supra note 15o ("[Y]oung American men and women who have
been arrested over the past year for trying to help the Islamic State . . . . are so diverse that
they defy a single profile.").
152. Apuzzo, supra note i5o ("Many studies seem to warn of the adolescent condition, singling
out young, impatient men with a sense of adventure who are 'struggling to achieve a sense
of selfhood."'); Liah Greenfeld, To Combat Terrorism, Tackle Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES
(July 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/07/15/can-we-just-live-with
-terrorism/to-combat-terrorism-tackle-mental-illness [http://perma.cc/7NEZ-EJVQ]
("The great majority of 'homegrown' or 'lone-wolf' terror acts are committed by people
with a known history of mental illness, most often depression, which counts social malad-
justment and problematic sense of self among its core symptoms."); Mehdi Hasan, How Is-
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that "ideology alone - even endorsement of terrorist activity - is such a poor
predictor of actual terrorist activity that [it] is almost worthless.""s' Indeed, a
study by the United Kingdom's M15 intelligence agency based on in-depth case
studies of hundreds of individuals associated with terrorist activity found that
"[f]ar from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terror-
ism do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could
actually be regarded as religious novices." 154 Another review of 5oo cases and
many other empirical studies have found that "a lack of religious literacy and
education appears to be a common feature among those that are drawn to [ter-
rorist] groups."'"' Because "[t]he ideology... is a secondary concern," even
FBI analysts are taught to "use actions, not ideas, to determine whether some-
one might carry out an attack.""5 '
b. Terrorism Sentencing Is Not Supported by Empirical Evidence
Neither the Sentencing Commission nor the courts applying the Terrorism
Enhancement have provided any empirical evidence to support the presump-
tion that terrorism defendants are uniquely dangerous. The legitimacy of the
Guidelines is derived from the belief that they are based on reliable data and
-YVTFV] (noting that individuals drawn to ISIS have a "sense of emotional and moral out-
rage" at the political situation in the Middle East and "are angry, or even bored, young men
in search of a call to arms and a thrilling cause"); Faiza Patel, Rethinking Radicalization,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 10-11 (2011), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files
/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf [http://perma.cc/2S8V-AN8M] ("Empirical research
on radicalization conclusively shows that the path to terrorism is far from linear. While stud-
ies have identified various factors that may influence the process, including personal circum-
stances, perceptions of injustice (both local and international), exposure to ideology that
promotes violence as 'jihad," and social bonds, it simply does not support the notion of a
clear path from personal or political discontent to violence.").
153. Jesse J. Norris, Entrapment and Terrorism on the Left: An Analysis of Post-9/11 Cases, 19 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 236, 269 n.206 (2016); see Jesse J. Norris, Why the FBI and the Courts Are
Wrong About Entrapment and Terrorism, 84 Miss. L.J. 1257, 1285-90 (2015); Marc Sageman,
The Stagnation in Terrorism Research, 26 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 565, 575 (2014).
154. Alan Travis, MI5 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain, GUARDIAN (Aug.
20, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorismi [http://
perma.cc/B35E-EDAE].
155. Patel, supra note 152, at io & n.63.
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principles.' 5 7 However, when the Terrorism Enhancement was promulgated,
no statistically sound evidence was used to substantiate that all terrorism de-
fendants were so different as to necessitate such a large increase in the Guide-
lines range.' 8 Similarly, courts of appeals upholding the idea that terrorism de-
fendants "are unique among criminals in the likelihood of recidivism, the
difficulty of rehabilitation, and the need for incapacitation" have also not cited
any evidence to support that opinion. 1
Moreover, while the Commission has recognized that first-time offenders
rarely recidivate, it has provided no evidence that those convicted of terrorism
offenses are an exception to this rule and recidivate at higher rates.160 While
"the question of recidivism after terrorism-related detention is empirically
fraught,"'1 6 1 the very limited available data suggests that individuals convicted
of terrorism offenses do not recidivate at higher rates than those convicted of
other crimes. Of the more than 300 prisoners who have completed their terror-
ism sentences since 2001, "Justice Department officials and outside experts
could identify only a handful of cases in which released inmates had been rear-
rested, a rate of relapse far below that for most federal inmates . ... 162
c. Individuals Who Commit Terrorism Offenses Can Be Deterred
Contrary to the assumption that all those convicted of terrorism offenses
cannot be deterred and the only adequate deterrence is full incapacitation, ter-
rorism experts and government officials have recognized that terrorists and
their supporters cannot be considered as a monolith, and many can be de-
157. McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 112 ("The Supreme Court and the Sentencing Commission
have opined that the deference to be given to the Sentencing Guidelines derives principally
from the fact that the Guidelines were developed based on the experience of thousands of
cases over a period of years.").
158. Id. at 112-15.
159. United States v. Meskini, 319 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2003); see, e.g., United States v. Jayyousi,
657 F.3d 1085, 1117 (11th Cit. 2011); Said, supra note So, at 481, 525, 527.
16o. McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 114-15.
161. Aziz Z. Huq, The Political Path of Detention Policy, 48 AM. CluM. L. REV. 1531, 1531 n.2 (2011).
162. Scott Shane, Beyond Guantinamo, a Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2oll/12/11/us/beyond-guantanamo-bay-a-web
-of-federal-prisons.html [http://perma.cc/XG52-SF2S]; see also id. ("[I]t appears extraordi-
narily rare for the federal prison inmates with past terrorist ties to plot violence after their
release. The government keeps a close eye on them: prison intelligence officers report regu-
larly to the Justice Department on visitors, letters and phone calls of inmates linked to ter-
rorism. Before the prisoners are freed, F.B.I. agents typically interview them, and probation
officers track them for years.").
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terred. 6 Skinner, for example, notes that outside "a relatively small group of
decision-makers," most "terrorist operatives participate as agents, not as initia-
tors."1 64 These agents can be deterred by cutting their "ideological ties to a larg-
er terrorist network."1 65 Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel add that because
"[m]any terrorist leaders, financiers, supporters, radical clerics, and other
members of terrorist networks value their lives and possessions," "[slimple
threats of imprisonment and death against these actors can deter terrorist activ-
ity."'66 They provide examples of radical clerics in the United Kingdom being
deterred from preaching incendiary sermons by threats of imprisonment, do-
nors in Saudi Arabia being deterred from financing terrorism due to increased
scrutiny, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines being de-
terred from cooperating with Al Qaeda by the threat of U.S. retaliation.' 67
Similarly, Samuel J. Rascoff notes that "[t]errorist foot soldiers behave
differently than operational commanders, financiers, and propagandists'" with
"[s]ome groups [being] more readily deterrable than others."' 8 Yet, he adds
that this recognition of deterrence "has been largely lost on lawyers, judges,
and legal academics, resulting in significant gaps between the practice of na-
tional security in this area and the legal architecture ostensibly designed to un-
dergird and oversee it."' 69 One aspect of this legal architecture is the Terrorism
Enhancement, which fails to acknowledge that "adequate deterrence" may
163. See, e.g., Samuel J. Rascoff, Counterterrorism and New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 830, 832
(2014) ("Deterrence began to make a small but palpable comeback in the discourse of some
security officials and commentators, partly because the effectiveness of alternative approach-
es, like preemption, had begun to be called into question." (citations omitted)); National
Strategy for Counterterrorism, supra note 65, at 6, 8 ("The successful prosecution of terrorists
will . . . deter terrorist activity . . .. [Target hardening] can deter [terrorists] from attacking
particular targets or persuade them that their efforts are unlikely to succeed.").
164. Skinner, supra note 32, at 344 (quoting Mark Weisburd, Al-Qaeda and the Law of War, ii
LEWIS &CLARKL. REV. 1063, 1069 (2007)).
165. Id.
166. Matthew Kroenig & Barry Pavel, How To Deter Terrorism, 35 WASH. Q. 25-26 (2012).
167. Id. at 26-27; see also ANDREAS WENGER & ALEx WILNER, DETERRING TERRORIsM: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 205-300 (2012) (providing several empirical studies of the deterrence of ter-
rorism in practice).
168. Rascoff, supra note 163, at 838 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Elbridge A. Col-
by, Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation, 149 POL'Y REV. 43, 52 (20o8)
("[T]he vast majority of terrorists, even those contemplating catastrophic attacks against us,
have some kind of rationale in mind, a strategy, a rational calculus that we can affect ....
Broadening our deterrent threat will let us seize more levers on these groups' behavior.").
169. Rascoff, supra note 163, at 830.
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differ based on the circumstances surrounding a defendant's conduct and
should be taken into account in sentencing.
d. Individuals Who Commit Terrorism Offenses Can Be Rehabilitated
Finally, the assumption that terrorism offenders cannot be rehabilitated is
also unsupported. While the United States has largely taken a punitive ap-
proach toward terrorism convicts,o other countries that have experienced
more immediate and extensive threats from young people joining extremist
groups have implemented rehabilitation programs focusing on mental health,
educational, family, economic, and religious counseling and social services. In
places like Germany and Northern Ireland, such programs were initially created
to address violence coming from domestic groups, like neo-Nazis, right-wing
extremists, and ultranationalists."' With the rise of Middle East-based terror-
ist organizations, countries throughout the world have established similar pro-
grams, including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Singapore, In-
donesia, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Denmark."' Some of these
programs are alternatives to incarceration, while others provide rehabilitative
170. Matt Apuzzo, Only Hard Choices for Parents Whose Children Flirt with Terror, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2o16/04/lo/us/parents-face-limited-options-to
-keep-children-from-terrorism.html [http://perma.cc/UD95-G4391.
171. Dratel, supra note ii, at 41 (discussing a Northern Ireland program that "spawned dozens of
public and privately sponsored programs designed to maintain peace, ensure security, ad-
dress grievances and perceived inequalities, promote healing, and build trust between the
police and the community"); Dina Temple-Raston, Methods for Reforming Neo-Nazis Help
Fight the Radicalization of Muslims, NPR (May 1o, 2016, 4:24 AM), http://www.npr
.org/sections/parallels/2o16/o5/10/47704352o/methods-for-reforming-neo-nazis-help-fight
-the-radicalization-of-muslims [http://perma.cc/JXH-2FMZ] (discussing a program called
"Exit-Deutschland," "which targeted neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists, groups that
German authorities have been working to de-radicalize and fold back into German society
for years").
172. See, e.g., Dratel, supra note II, at 41-44; Audie Cornish, German Program Helps Families De-
Radicalize Members Prone to Extremism, NPR (Mar. 13, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://www.npr
.org/2015/03/13/392845800/german-program-helps-families-de-radicalize-members-prone
-to-extremism [http://perma.cc/Q2FR- 5 SFY]; Hanna Rosin, How a Danish Town
Helped Young Muslims Turn Away from ISIS, NPR (July 15, 2016, 3:05
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/15/485900076/how-a-danish
-town-helped-young-muslims-turn-away-from-isis [http://perma.cc/RASB-GTDY]; Tem-
ple-Raston, supra note 171; Risk Reduction for Countering Violent Extremism: Explorative Re-
view by the International Resource Center for Countering Violent Extremism, QATAR INT'L ACAD.
FOR SECURITY STUD. 10 (NOV. 2010) [hereinafter QIASS Report], http://qiass.org
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services in conjunction with criminal proceedings, and participation can lead to
shorter sentences.1 7 3 Many of these programs have been successful in rehabili-
tating terrorism offenders and helping them adjust back into society.1 7 ' For ex-
ample, in one Danish town., about 330 individuals -including eighteen who
had returned from Syria- have participated in a rehabilitation program, lead-
ing to a significant decrease in the number of young Muslims joining ISIS,
from thirty in 2013 to only one the following year.17 - Moreover, in the Saudi
Arabian program, about 1,400 individuals have renounced their past terrorist
activities, and Saudi authorities claim a "success rate" of between eighty to
ninety percent. 176
Many individuals have also rejected their past support for terrorist groups
without even participating in rehabilitation programs. With regard to ISIS,
hundreds of young Muslims who traveled to Syria and Iraq to join the terrorist
organization have now returned to their home countries, denounced the group,
and expressed regret for travelling in the first place.1 7 7 Many of these individu-
als are facing lengthy terms of incarceration in their home countries, but an ap-
proach focused on rehabilitation may be a more effective counterterrorism
strategy. Peter Neumann argues that governments should encourage more de-
fectors to publicly counter ISIS's recruiting tactics and to "remove legal disin-
centives" in the form of imprisonment that deter individuals from speaking
out. 178
173. See, e.g., Dratel, supra note 11, at 37-48; QIASS Report, supra note 172, at 6; see also Temple-
Raston, supra note 171 (noting that participation in the German Hayat program "can actually
have a very positive effect on sentencing later on").
174. Dratel, supra note 11, at 14.
175. Tim Mansel, How I Was De-Radicalised, BBC NEws (July 2, 2015), http://www.bbc.com
/news/magazine-33344898 [http://perma.cc/8VRP-TK3S]; Rosin, supra note 172.
176. Christopher Boucek, Saudi Arabia's "Soft" Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilita-
tion, and Aftercare, 97 CARNEGIE PAPERS 1, 21-22 (Sept. 2008), http://carnegieendowment
.org/files/cp97_boucek saudifinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/83XD-7MW4].
177. Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, ISIS Defectors Reveal Disillusionment, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2o1 5 /o9/21/world/europe/isis-defectors-reveal-disillusion
ment.html [http://perma.cc/K2R9-PEKM]; Peter R. Neumann, Victims, Perpetrators, Assets:
The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors, INT'L CTR. FOR STUDY RADICALISATION & POL. ViO-
LENCE (2015), http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2o1 5/o9/ICSR-Report-Victims-Perper
trators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf [http://perma.cc/83PZ
-GNZP].
178. De Freytas-Tamura, supra note 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. War on Drugs
The failure to recognize that many young Muslims who commit terrorism
offenses can be deterred and rehabilitated echoes a similarly held belief by poli-
cymakers and commentators years earlier in the War on Drugs - that young Af-
rican Americans convicted of gang-related drug offenses presented a distinctive
threat to American society that called for lengthy punishment. Perhaps the
term that best personified the perceived threat was "super-predator." Coined by
Princeton Political Science Professor John Dilulio, super-predators were pre-
dominantly "black inner-city males," allegedly "hardened, remorseless juve-
niles" with "absolutely no respect for human life.""' Dilulio added:
They are perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of
physical violence for the most trivial reasons . . . . They fear neither the
stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprisonment .... So for as long as
their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes "naturally":
murder, rape, rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get
high. 180
The fear of super-predators was expressed by politicians across the political
spectrum. For example, Dilulio co-authored a book with John Walters and
William Bennett, head of the Office of Drug Policy under President George H.
W. Bush, entitled Body Count: Moral Poverty ... and How To Win America's War
Against Crime and Drugs, where they spoke of the need to incapacitate "juvenile
'super-predators' - radically impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters, includ-
ing ever more pre-teenage boys, who murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize,
deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs, and create communal disorders."''
Similarly, when discussing support for her husband's War on Drugs agenda,
then-First Lady Hillary Clinton spoke of addressing the need to punish young
men who "are often connected to big drug cartels." 182 She stated, "[T] hey are
not just gangs of kids anymore. They are often the kinds of kids that are called




181. WILLIAM BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY. . . AND How To WIN AMERICA'S
WARAGAINST POVERTY AND DRUGS 27 (1996).
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'super-predators'- no conscience, no empathy. We can talk about why they
ended up that way, but first we have to bring them to heel."'
These views were shared by the federal legislators who drafted the very
bills that led to disproportionately high sentences for African Americans in the
War on Drugs. For example, to justify the 100-to-1 crack cocaine disparity,
Senator Lawton Chiles warned of people who "will go out and steal, rob, lie,
cheat, take money from any savings, take refrigerators out of their houses, any-
thing they can get their hands on to maintain that habit," which has caused an
increase in "the crimes of burglary, robbery, assault, purse snatching, [and]
mugging."18 Dilulio himself had a direct influence on federal legislation, when
he testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee about the harm from
young African Americans "surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal
adults in chaotic, dysfunctional, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings where
drug abuse and child abuse are twins, and self-respecting young men literally
aspire to get away with murder.""s
Because of the assumed threat posed by these young African American
men, the focus on addressing the problem was not rehabilitation, but rather
lengthy punishment. And harsh sentencing laws were believed to be necessary
to protect Americans. Furthermore, as with the War on Terror, because the
threat was premised on a violent cultural ideology ingrained in the offender,
the individual circumstances of each defendant or his crime of conviction did
not matter. As Joseph Margulies argues, "A belief that terrorism always reflects
the act of an inherently malevolent disposition, for which no further explana-
tion is possible or necessary, swims in the same stream as a similar view
of ... juvenile super-predators."" 6 From this point of view, "[T]he criminal
has been reimagined from one of us - a person for whom society bears some
responsibility and who must therefore be reformed and rehabilitated- to one
of them-a monster who must be separated from us and whose behavior must
be monitored and controlled."'"'
183. Id.
184. 132 CONG. REc. 31,329-30 (Oct. 15, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles).
185. The Changing Nature of Youth Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the S.
Comm. on theJudiciary, 1o4 th Cong. 1, 24 (1996) (statement of John J. Dilulio, Jr.).
186. Joseph Margulies, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand for the Preventive Deten-
tion of Suspected Terrorists, io J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 732 (2011).
187. Id. at 744.
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However, just like in the terrorism context, fears of young, African Ameri-
can super-predators unable to rehabilitate were inaccurate and overblown.'
The increase in violent crime that led to the super-predator myth has dropped
significantly in the past twenty years."' Even Dilulio himself has admitted that
his views on super-predators were incorrect and has apologized for his role in
establishing severe penalties that disproportionately harm young African
Americans.1 90 Many now have also recognized that the majority of individuals
being sentenced in the War on Drugs were not violent, hardened criminals, but
rather were capable of rehabilitation and reintegration into society.19
III. THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF LENGTHY INCARCERATION ON
AFRICAN AMERICAN AND AMERICAN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES
The faulty premise underlying sentencing policies in the Wars on Drugs
and Terror has not only led to significant prison sentences for many young Af-
rican Americans and American Muslims. It has also caused harm to African
American and American Muslim communities more broadly in similar ways.
These negative effects include (1) increasing discrimination by reinforcing ste-
reotypes of African Americans and Muslims as inherently dangerous, (2) fur-
thering distrust of law enforcement among African Americans and Muslims,
which undermines government objectives by making these communities less
likely to cooperate in criminal investigations, and (3) failing to effectively reha-
bilitate drug and terrorism offenders and reintegrate them into society.
A. War on Drugs
The harsh sentencing laws in the War on Drugs have had profound, nega-
tive consequences for African American communities throughout the United
States. For example, the prison level for African Americans convicted of drug-
related offenses in 2000 was twenty-six times that in 1983.192 In some commu-
nities, three-fourths of African American men have served prison time, and
188. See, e.g., Meredith Lamberti, Children Are Different: Why Iowa Should Adopt a Categorical Ban
on Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Homicide Offenders, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 311, 331-32
(2015).
189. Id. at 332.
19o. Id.
191. Punishment and Prejudice, supra note 67.
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more African Americans are in prison or under correctional supervision than
were enslaved in 1850.1" This mass incarceration has led to the discrimination
and stigmatization of young African American men, significant distrust of law
enforcement in African American communities, and the failure to effectively
rehabilitate offenders during and after their sentences.
First, the myth of the "super-predator" and high incarceration rates have
caused discrimination against African American men from a public who view
them as exceptionally dangerous.194 Not only have African Americans been dis-
proportionately targeted by the police, they have also faced discrimination in a
variety of areas, including employment, housing, and access to public ser-
vices." This mistreatment is due in part to stereotypes of young African
Americans as drug offenders and criminals based on the media hysteria created
in the aftermath of the crack-cocaine epidemic and inner-city gang violence
that led to the creation of harsh criminal penalties in the War on Drugs.1 9 6
Second, the severe penalties and disproportionate targeting of African
Americans have also created significant distrust of law enforcement in African
American communities. The sentences are viewed by many African Americans
as illegitimate uses of government power that have directly harmed their family
members and friends. 9 7 As a consequence, African Americans have higher lev-
els of distrust of law enforcement when compared to whites and are less likely
to cooperate in investigations.' 9 s
193. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 9 (2011).
194. Huq & Muller, supra note 6o, at 4.
195. See, e.g., Jillian Berman, The job Market Discriminates Against Black College Grads, HUFFING-
TON PosT (May 20, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2o14/os/2o/black-college
-graduatesn_5358983.html [http://perma.cc/H7P7-A8XU]; Shaila Dewan, Discrimination
in Housing Against Nonwhites Persists Quietly, U.S. Study Finds, N.Y. TiMEs (June ii,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/o6/12/business/economy/discrimination-in-housing
-against-nonwhites-persists-quietly-us-study-finds.htmIl [http://perma.cc/8DGV-HEW7];
Corrado Giulietti et al., Racial Discrimination in Local Public Services: A Field Experiment in
the US (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 9290, 2015), http://ftp.iza.org
/dp9290.pdf [http://perma.cc/7DKY-EEGC].
196. See, e.g., Race And Punishment: Racial Perceptions Of Crime And Support For Punitive Policies,
SENT'G PROJECT 3-4 (2014) [hereinafter Race and Punishment], http://www.sentencing
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2o 5 /ii/Race-and-Punishment.pdf [http://perma.cc/9L8S
-M7561.
197. Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of
Muslim Americans, 44 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 365, 369-70 (2010); Race and Punishment, supra
note 196, at 33-35.
198. Frank Newport, Gallup Review: Black and White Attitudes Toward Police, GALLUP (Aug. 20,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 7 5o88/gallup-review-black-white-attitudes-toward
-police.aspx [http://perma.cc/XX6B-J2GB]; Reducing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice
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Third, the focus of drug sentencing laws on punishment trumped any de-
sire to help rehabilitate offenders. Due to the belief that young African Ameri-
can convicts were uniquely dangerous and not worthy of rehabilitation, efforts
to support drug treatment and alternatives to incarceration were rejected. For
example, during debate over the 1994 crime bill, policymakers rejected efforts
by members of the Congressional Black Caucus that would have increased
funding for drug treatment by two billion dollars and early intervention pro-
grams by three billion dollars.' 99 Instead, the law that was eventually passed
made it harder for offenders to rehabilitate by removing their ability to receive
Pell Grants for higher education while incarcerated. 20
B. War on Terror
1. Differences Between Communities Affected by 'the Wars on Drugs and
Terror
Before comparing the harms faced by African American communities in the
War on Drugs and those faced by American Muslims in the War on Terror, I
must first acknowledge important demographic differences between the two
groups. The population of Muslims in the United States is much smaller than
the population of African Americans, and the percentage of Muslims convicted
of terrorism-related crimes is also much smaller than the percentage of African
Americans convicted of drug-related crimes. While the Muslim American pop-
ulation has been estimated to be at most six to seven million,201 forty-two mil-
lion identify as African American.20 2 Furthermore, as explained above, drug-
sentencing policies have had a widespread impact on African Americans.203 The




199. Elizabeth Hinton et al., Did Blacks Really Endorse the 1994 Crime Bill?, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr.
13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/opinion/did-blacks-really-endorse-the-1 9
94-crime-bill.html [http://perma.cc/AC68-BR9A].
200. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20411, 1o8
Stat. 1796, 1828 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 104oa(b)(6) (2012)).
201. Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream, PEw RES. CTR. ii (May 22, 2007),
http://www.pewresearch.org/files/2007/o5/muslim-americans.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PH2
-TX9D].
202. Sonya Rastogi et al.,. The Black Population: 2010, U.S. CENSus BuREAU 3 (Sept. 2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2olo/briefs/c2olobr-o6.pdf [http://perma.cc/5822-S223].
203. See supra Section III.A.
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same cannot be said for terrorism sentencing policies' effect on Muslims, as on-
ly a few hundred have been charged with terrorism offenses, and the vast ma-
jority reject the violent extremist ideology of foreign terrorist organizations.20 4
For the most part, these differences do not affect the arguments made in
this Feature. They have no effect on how young African American and Muslim
men have been viewed as uniquely dangerous in the Wars on Drugs and Terror,
respectively, leading to harsh sentencing policies in both contexts. They do,
however, demonstrate why the consequences of the War on Drugs in the Unit-
ed States has affected a much larger segment of the American population than
those of the War on Terror. This helps explain why African American commu-
nities have been more successful in advocating for community policing reforms
than their Muslim counterparts have been in changing federal counterterrorism
policies.20 s Since terrorism offenders make up a much smaller percentage of
American Muslims, one might also expect that they would not be stereotyped
in the same way as African Americans. However, because Muslims are also a
much smaller percentage of the U.S. population, many Americans do not per-
sonally know any Muslims, which, as demonstrated below, leads to high levels
of discrimination toward Muslims and association of Muslims with violence.206
2. Negative Consequences of the War on Terror
Despite the demographic differences between Muslim and African Ameri-
can communities, American Muslims have faced consequences in the aftermath
of the government's War on Terror policies similar to those suffered by African
Americans due to the War on Drugs, including discrimination and stigmatiza-
tion of Muslims, distrust of law enforcement in Muslim communities, and the
failure to effectively rehabilitate offenders.
204. CHARLES KURZMAN, THE MISSING MARTYRS: WHY THERE ARE So FEW MUSLIM TERRORISTS
11 (2011); Tyler et al., supra note 197, at 366 ("Recent studies suggest that [American Mus-
lims] generally express strong allegiance to America and very little support for terrorism or
terrorists."); By the Numbers, supra note 5.
205. See Aziz, supra note 151, at 210-11.
206. See, e.g., Mona Chalabi, Americans Are More Likely To Like Muslims If They Know One, FIVE
THIRTY EIGHT (Feb. 13, 2015, 5:18 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/americans-are
-more-likely-to-like-muslims-if-they-lanow-one/ [http://perma.cc/2QXD-A4BM]; Pew Fo-
rum on Religion & Pub. Life, Muslims Widely Seen as Facing Discrimination, PEW RES. CTR.
11 (2009), http://www.pewforum.org/files/2009/o9/surveyo9o9.pdf [http://perma.cc
/A3GK-AZ2E]; Matt Sledge, Muslim Americans Widely Seen as Victims of Discrimination,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2015, 5:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.Com/2015/02
/23/muslim-americans-discrimination-n 6738642.html [http://perma.cc/C6AC-T53H].
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a. Discrimination and Stigmatization
As mentioned above, Muslims are disproportionately prosecuted in the
War on Terror. In some instances this is because the policies are specifically de-
signed to target Muslims (similar to how War on Drugs policies like the oo-
to-1 crack cocaine disparity targeted African Americans). For example, the ma-
terial support ban in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B only prohibits providing material sup-
port to a "foreign terrorist organization" designated by the Secretary of State. 207
Providing similar support to a domestic terrorist organization is not criminal-
ized.20 8 Since many Muslims accused of violating section 2339B provide sup-
port to foreign groups such as ISIS, they are convicted of conduct that would
not be illegal if it were provided to domestic extremist groups, like the Ku Klux
Klan. For entirely domestic terrorist crimes, an individual's material support
must be in furtherance of a specified terrorism offense to be illegal.209
Even outside the material support context, "[t]errorism-like crimes com-
mitted by Arab or Muslim Americans get treated as terrorism, but similar
crimes by non-Arabs/non-Muslims . .. are generally not viewed as terror-
ism."210 For example, Tung Yin analyzed multiple attempted bombings and
mass shootings in the United States and found that those committed by Mus-
lims were more likely to be characterized as "terrorism" than those committed
by non-Muslims.2 11 Similarly, unlike Muslims, when Christians commit crimes
because "God supposedly told them to do so," they are not considered terror-
ists, but instead their religious zeal is often treated as a mitigating factor, such
as diminished capacity or insanity.212 Due to the Terrorism Enhancement, how
a crime is categorized can have a significant impact on sentencing, and there-
207. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
208. See Said, supra note 5o, at 506.
zog. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; see also Said, supra note 5o, at 5o6 ("[M]aterially supporting [foreign ter-
rorist organizations] can result in very high sentences for what would otherwise be innocu-
ous and constitutionally protected activity. In contrast, in cases involving purely domestic
terrorist crimes with no international bent, the available decisions of the federal circuit
courts involve some form of violent activity or conspiracy to commit violence, without ex-
ception.").
210. Tung Yin, Were Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber the Only White Terrorists?: Race, Reli-
gion, and the Perception of Terrorism, 4 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV. 33, 35 (2013).
211. Id. at 43-53.
212. Id. at 72 & n.244 (citing State v. Roque, 141 P-3 d 368, 389 (Ariz. 20o6); People v. Codding-
ton, 2 P.3 d 1o81 (Cal. 2000); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 131 (Colo. 1992)).
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fore Muslims can receive higher sentences for similar conduct committed by
non-Muslims.2 13
Similarly, despite the increase in right-wing extremist and militia
groups,214 government counter-radicalization programs designed to stop indi-
viduals from embracing violent extremism-such as the Obama Administra-
tion's "Countering Violent Extremism" program "-have focused almost en-
tirely on terrorism committed by Muslims.2 16 And, although social scientists
agree that there is no one path that radicalizes an individual to become violent,
these programs often "scrutiniz[e] Muslims who are highly religious, hold un-
savory or critical political views of American domestic or foreign policy, and/or
are first- or second-generation Muslim immigrants deemed unassimilated into
the dominant Anglo-Judeo-Christian-American culture."217 This radicalization
discourse "creates false and stigmatizing equivalences . . . between Islam, Mus-
lims, and terrorism."218
By reinforcing the belief that Muslims are uniquely prone to terrorism,
government policies have led to private acts of discrimination against Muslims
213. See supra Part I; see also Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, What's Terrorism Got To Do With It?
The Perils of Prosecutorial Misuse of Terrorism Offenses, 39 FIA. ST. U. L. REV. 807, 843-44
(2012) (noting "sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants and lack of uni-
formity and consistency in charging decisions" and providing an example of "Muhammad,
who was a Muslim, was prosecuted under the terrorism statute, [while] McCoy was prose-
cuted under 'ordinary' murder charges"); Yin, supra note 210, at 67 (noting that being la-
beled a "terrorist" results in a significant sentencing increase).
214. See Kurt Eichenwald, Right-Wing Extremists Are a Bigger Threat to America than ISIS,
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 4, 2016, 6:02 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/12/right-wing
-extremists-militants-bigger-threat-america-isis-jihadists-422743.html [http://perma.cc
/Y3S4-2WFE]. A 2015 Georgetown study of 119 lone wolf attackers found that "the majority
are white men with criminal records" and "more than half were found to subscribe to white
supremacist or extremist far-right ideologies." Engy Abdelkader, Mental Illness: A Key Factor
in 'Terror,' HUFFINGTON PosT (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry
/mental-illness-a-key-factor-in-terror usS7a4946e4boccbo2372dcf [http://perma.cc
/BG 5 N-DEXY]. The study added that terrorism from self-identifying Muslims "poses no
greater threat to the public than other forms of domestic radicalization." Id.
215. See Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, WHITE
HOUSE (Aug., 2011) [hereinafter Empowering Local Partners], http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/empowering_1ocal-partners.pdf [http://perma.cc/U8R8-32L4]; Dina
Temple-Raston, White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan, NPR (Aug. 3, 2011, 1:24
PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/o8/0 4 /1 3 89 55 790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism
-plan [http://perma.cc/BY6M-B9VT].
216. Aziz, supra note 151, at 164-65, 182-83.
217. Id. at 167.
218. Akbar, supra note io8, at 895.
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as well. 2 19 As Sahar Aziz writes, "As the public interprets the government's ac-
tions as part of reasonable national security policies, private actors feel justified
in discriminating against Muslims in employment, housing, education, and
public accommodations." 2 20 This has led to a broad range of discriminatory
acts, including "vandalizing mosques with anti-Muslim graffiti and dead pigs,
burning down children's play centers," and "pressur[ing] local governments to
bar mosque constructions and expansions on grounds that they are terrorist
breeding centers."221 Recent studies have found that nearly two-thirds of Mus-
lims experienced discrimination in the past year.222 There were 174 reported in-
cidents of anti-Muslim violence and vandalism in 2015,223 and anti-Muslim
hate crimes are five times more common today than before 9/11.224
b. Distrust of Law Enforcement
As American Muslims feel unjustly targeted by government practices due to
their religious beliefs, their distrust of law enforcement has increased as well.22 5
This distrust is caused by "[t]he dominant model of counterterrorism policing
[that] has emphasized coercion and surveillance over the elicitation of coopera-
tion through trust-building." 2 6 When communities doubt the fairness and le-
219. Aziz, supra note i51, at 154, 186; Huq et al., supra note 64, at 423.
220. Aziz, supra note 151, at 186.
221. Id. at 186-87; see also Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the
First Amendment, 5 HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 347, 349 (2011) ("[R]ecent data on Muslim Ameri-
ca suggests that ambient public animus is on the rise, and furthermore increasingly taking
the form of legal enactments.").
222. Rashed Mian, Study Highlights Election-Year Islamophobia's Negative Impact on Muslims, LONG
ISLAND PRESS (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.longislandpress.com/2ol6/o9/o8/study
-highlights-election-year-islamophobias-negative-impact-on-muslims/ [http://perma.cc
/PBN8- 3BA 9 ].
223. Engy Abdelkader, Special Report: When Islamophobia Turns Violent: The 2016 Presidential Elec-
tions, BRIDGE INITIATIVE 1 (2016), http://bridge.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2o16
/os/When-Islamophobia-Turns-Violent.pdf [http://perma.cc/IGVI3J-RTLG].
224. Christopher Ingraham, Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Are Still Five Times More Common Today
than Before 9/11, WASH. POST (Feb. ii, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2015/o2/u1/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-are-still-five-times-more-common-today
-than-before-9n/ [http://perma.cc/9T2F-YRQS].
225. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. THOMAS, SCAPEGOATING ISLAM: INTOLERANCE, SECURITY, AND THE
AMERICAN MUSLIM 161 (2015); Sahar Aziz, Racial Profiling by Law Enforcement Is Poisoning
Muslim Americans' Trust, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/comment
isfree/cifamerica/2ol2/feb/21/racial-profiling-law-enforcement-muslim-americans [http://
perma.cc/WZP5-PEP 7 ].
226. Huq et al., supra note 64, at 423.
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gitimacy of police tactics (as African Americans did with War on Drugs poli-
cies), they are less likely to cooperate with law enforcement. American Muslims
are no exception.227 For example, one study found "a robust correlation be-
tween perceptions of procedural justice and both perceived legitimacy and will-
ingness to cooperate among Muslim American communities in the context of
antiterrorism policing."228 Other research has demonstrated that private dis-
crimination of Muslims also makes them less likely to cooperate with law en-
forcement based on "[p]erceptions that officials share and act on that ani-
mus."229
Muslims' unwillingness to cooperate with law enforcement can have seri-
ous negative ramifications for U.S. counterterrorism policy. When based on ac-
tual threats and not overbroad practices that stereotype an entire faith, law en-
forcement cooperation with American Muslims has already played a vital role
in preventing terrorist activity.2 30 Twenty-six percent of Muslims convicted of
terrorism offenses have been implicated by a tip from family and community
members. 23 1 As the FBI has recognized, "[U]pholding and enhancing the
community's trust [allows] law enforcement [to] counter the spread
of ... extremist ideology."232 Muslims' distrust may also undermine counter-
227. See Dratel, supra note ii, at 52 ("Currently, Muslim communities believe they are targeted
unfairly by law enforcement with respect to terrorism investigations and stings, leading to a
'circling the wagons' mentality. That sentiment provides a disincentive to cooperate with au-
thorities on a routine basis."); Tyler et al., supra note 197, at 367 ("Judgments about proce-
dural justice have been found to influence the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement and
thus to affect willingness to comply and to cooperate.").
As a Human Rights Watch report explained, "counterterrorism efforts, including sur-
veillance and the use of informants, cause such significant harm to community-law en-
forcement trust that they may understandably deter communities from accepting any gov-
ernment support. Mosque and community leaders may also be reluctant to engage with
youth and other members they identify as at risk of committing a crime, out of fear that they
will be tainted by association and come under government scrutiny themselves." Illusion of
Justice, supra note 28, at 176.
228. Tyler et al., supra note 197, at 368; see also Dratel, supra note ii, at 60 (noting "the perception
in the community that Muslims are being unfairly targeted in counterterrorism investiga-
tions . . . informs community reaction to counterterrorism enforcement").
229. Huq, supra note 221, at 357.
230. For example, family members have approached government agencies about potential at-
tacks, mosques officials have dissuaded those turning to terrorism, and others have flagged
imminent risks to law enforcement. Id. at 358.
231. Bergen et al., Terrorism in AmericaAfter 9/11, Part IV, supra note 80.
232. Huq, supra note 221, at 358 (quoting Carol Dyer et al., Countering Violent Islamic Extremism:
A Community Responsibility, 76 FBI/L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 3, 8 (2007)). More broadly, law
enforcement "has sought to build relationships with American Muslim community leaders
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terrorism policy because it can make them more likely to believe the narrative
of foreign terrorist organizations "that the West is somehow at war with a reli-
gion that includes over a billion adherents."233 As President Obama recognized,
"That's not smart national security."2 34
The belief that Muslims are being targeted based on their religious and po-
litical views instead of actual criminal conduct has also hindered the ability of
Muslims to address extremism within their own communities. For example,
counterterrorism policies have created a chilling effect among young American
Muslims who have deeply critical views of American foreign policy or espouse
deviant religious beliefs.23 5 Instead of engaging with mainstream Muslim insti-
tutions to address their concerns, these individuals are more likely to interact
amongst themselves in secret and become more susceptible to the views of ter-
rorists abroad.23 ' As American Muslim cleric Yasir Qadhi stated, "Like it or not,
when kids find out that their peers are getting is years for what looks a lot like
a thought crime, it makes them more secretive because it reinforces the idea
that the government is out to get them."2
The lengthy sentences that young American Muslims have received for ter-
rorism-related offenses have, in particular, decreased incentives for Muslim
families to cooperate with counterterrorism officials.238 For example, in the case
and groups, believing they are critical sources of information to prevent terrorist at-
tacks ... [and] to build American Muslim communities' sense of cohesion and trust in law
enforcement." Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 7.
233. Remarks by the President at Eid Reception, WHITE HOUSE (July 21, 2016), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o16/o7/21/remarks-president-eid-reception [http://
perma.cc/QGZ5-ZQT5].
234. Id.; see also Dratel, supra note ii, at 57 ("[P]roportionality in counterterrorism enforcement
is essential in order to imbue the justice system with integrity, consistency, fairness, and log-
ic, and to achieve success in making communities safer.").
235. See Akbar, supra note io8, at 904 (explaining that counterterrorism strategy "creat[es] a cli-
mate of fear and chill [s] constitutionally protected activity" (quoting Joint Statement Regard-
ing Upcoming Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, COUNCIL ON AM.-ISLAMIC REL. (Feb.
17, 2015), http://www.cair.com/images/pdf/CAIR-CVE-summit-statement.pdf [http://
perma.cc/BL28-CZU5])); Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 57, 167.
236. Reitman, supra note 81 ("We want these kids to bring their grievances out in the open. But
in the absence of genuine dialogue that could be tempered with some elderly wisdom,
young men and women, frustrated at what they perceive as the increasing injustices of our
foreign policy, gravitate to clerics with more black-and-white views on Islam and the West."
(quoting American Muslim cleric and professor Yasir Qadhi)).
237. Id.
238. See, e.g., Scott Shane, From Minneapolis to ISIS: An American's Path to fihad, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/world/middleeast/from-minneapolis
-to-isis-an-americans-path-to-jihad.html [http://perma.cc/8RBF-DT9P] ("Parents and
1564
126:152o 2017
IS HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF?
of Ali Shukri Amin, who received an eleven-year sentence for tweeting pro-
ISIS material and helping his friend travel to Syria, law enforcement was
tipped off to Amin's Twitter activity by his own family.23 ' After Amin's sentenc-
ing, his attorney and a local Muslim leader both indicated that parents may be
less likely to involve law enforcement when their children are recruited by ISIS
online.2 4 0 The Muslim leader added, " [Amin's parents] were looking for a men-
tor to come in and help this child navigate away from this drastic path [he was]
taking. They were not looking for their child to be taken away for 11 years."24 1
Another case is Adam Shafi, a twenty-two-year-old who considered joining
ISIS but was stopped by law enforcement before boarding a flight to Turkey.2 42
Shafi had been turned in by his own father, who had been communicating with
the FBI over his attorney's objections.243 Shafi was charged with attempting to
support ISIS and could face up to twenty years in prison.244 Shafi's father be-
lieves he made a mistake by contacting the FBI, and his message for other par-
ents now is: "Don't even think about going to the government."24 5
c. Failure To Effectively Rehabilitate Offenders
Finally, just as with offenders in the War on Drugs, the government's focus
when convicting young American Muslims in the War on Terror has not been
to promote their rehabilitation, but instead to incapacitate them with lengthy
punitive sentences. Based on fears that, even in prison, terrorists may cause
harm by communicating with those on the outside, government officials have
placed individuals in harsh conditions, including solitary confinement, and
have imposed significant restrictions on their communications.24 6 Such policies
friends concerned about a young person drawn to the Islamic State are more likely to call the
police, advocates say, if they believe there is an alternative to a long prison sentence.").
239. Matt Zapotosky, Northern Virginia Teen Sentenced to 11 Years for Aiding Islamic State, WASH.
PosT (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/a-sophisticated
-terrorist-supporter-or-a-troubled-teen/2015/8/27/9138cb6e-4cle-n1e5-bfb9-9736do4fc8e4
story.html [http://perma.cc/R768-LFF7].
240. Julie Carey, Virginia Teen Sentenced to More Than 11 Years for Helping ISIS, NBC WASH.
(Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Teen-to-Be-Sentenced-for
-Helping-ISIS-323193661ihtml [http://perma.cc/D3LT-6BRQ].
241. Id.




246. Illusion of Justice, supra note 28, at 112-21, 133-51.
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include Communication Management Units (CMUs), which severely restrict
prisoners' communications (telephone, mail, visitation) and monitor their ac-
tivities twenty-four hours a day.247 Often, the application of these measures
fails to distinguish between hardened terrorists and individuals, like the ones
discussed in this Feature, whose convictions are not tied to any act of violence
or viable threat. For example, Sabri Benkahla, who received a ten-year sentence
for making false statements to a grand jury and the FBI, was sent to a CMU,
denied contact visits with family, and only allowed one fifteen-minute call per
week. This is despite the fact that the sentencing judge unequivocally stated
that he "is not a terrorist" and "[h]is likelihood of ever committing another
crime is infinitesimal." 248
Furthermore, not only do lengthy sentences hinder rehabilitation, but they
can also promote recidivism, especially in the terrorism context. For example,
one study analyzing prisoners generally suggests that "[e]nduring years of sep-
aration from family and community . .. [creates] [a]nger, frustration, and a
burning sense of injustice, . . . [which] significantly reduce the likelihood that
prisoners are able to pursue a viable, relatively conventional life after release."24 9
Others have argued that significant time in prison can "'harden[]terrorist de-
fendants against America, and contribut[e] to the development or entrench-
ment of terrorist networks" because of the well-documented "correlation be-
tween prison and extremism."250 In particular, there is evidence "to suggest that
conditions of confinement can push toward extremism those terrorist defend-
ants that might have previously lacked very radical beliefs." 251' Therefore, harsh
conditions like CMUs can be counterproductive, increasing the likelihood that
247. Id. at 131, 138-41.
248. Id. at 128-29, 153-54.
249. James Austin et al., Unlocking America: Why and How To Reduce America's Prison Population,
JFA INST. 10 (2007), http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications/srs/UnlockingAmerica
.pdf [http://perma.cc/2FSZ-RTNP]; see also Dratel, supra note 11, at 59 ("[T]o the extent a
particular inmate's criminality was the product of mental or emotional instability, the sepa-
ration from other stimuli will only drive them to further emotional and ideological isola-
tion.").
250. Skinner, supra note 32, at 371; see also QIASS Report, supra note 172, at 11 ("A substantial
number of persons with alleged connections to violent extremist organizations have been in-
carcerated over the past decade, and some are now being released back to the community. A
proportion of them have more extreme views and commitments to violence than when they
began their detention.").
251. Skinner, supra note 32, at 372. Skinner gives the example of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who after being subject to mistreatment in an Egyptian prison was transformed
from a relative moderate into a violent extremist. Id. at 372-73.
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individuals will be dangerous when they eventually get out of prison.25 2 This is
a particular concern in American prisons, where programs focused on rehabili-
tating individuals convicted of terrorism offenses have not been instituted.5
IV. ADDRESSING THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF LENGTHY
INCARCERATION
While American Muslim and African American communities have suffered
similar harms due to the government's sentencing policies in the Wars on Ter-
ror and Drugs, the present-day responses to counter those harms have been
very different. In response to the negative effects of lengthy incarceration
caused by the War on Drugs, government officials have recognized that a more
nuanced approach consisting of shorter sentences for nonviolent offenders and
a greater focus on rehabilitation is a more beneficial way of taclding America's
drug problem. Yet, despite the various reforms that have been instituted in the
War on Drugs, the lessons learned from the War on Drugs have not yet been
applied to help reverse the negative effects caused by the War on Terror's harsh
sentencing policies.
A. War on Drugs
Over the past decade, increasing criticism has mounted against punitive
drug sentencing policies and the harm they have caused African American
communities. Policymakers have also raised concerns about the high financial
costs associated with lengthy incarceration.254 As a result, a series of reforms
have taken place to lower sentences for drug-related crimes and focus on reha-
bilitating drug offenders.
The judicial reform with perhaps the greatest impact on drug sentencing
policy was the Supreme Court's 2005 Booker decision making the Sentencing
Guidelines advisory.255 After Booker, courts have increasingly varied downward
252. Dratel, supra note ii, at 58 (noting the problems with CMUs because they will allow "[t]he
more radical and violent [prisoners to] transform the less so, not vice versa" (emphasis
omitted)); Skinner, supra note 32, at 373 (noting that "[t]he current sentencing practice of
imposing lengthy sentences, across the board to all softcore terrorist defendants, exacerbates
th[e] risk [of recidivism]").
253. See infra Part IV.
254. See, e.g., Senators Announce Bipartisan Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, U.S. SENATE
COMM. ON JUDICIARY (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/senators-an
nounce-bipartisan-sentencing-reform-and-corrections-act [http://perma.cc/4Y2V-B2Y6].
255. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233, 245 (2005).
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in drug cases when the Guidelines range produces sentences "that are greater
than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553-*12"6
Important changes were also made to the Guidelines themselves. For example,
the Fair Sentencing Act of 201o reduced the ioo-to-1 sentencing disparity for
crack versus powder cocaine to 18-to-1 and eliminated the five-year mandatory
minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine. And, the Sentencing
Commission retroactively reduced the offense levels for drug trafficking offens-
es by two, leading to the release of thousands of federal inmates. 258 The Justice
Department has followed suit. As part of his "Smart on Crime" initiative, At-
torney General Eric Holder issued policy memoranda instructing federal prose-
cutors to avoid charging mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug offend-
ers. 2 In a similar vein, President Obama has granted clemency to hundreds of
federal inmates serving long prison terms for nonviolent drug offenses.260
At the same time, increased attention has been given to the treatment and
rehabilitation of drug offenders in lieu of lengthy punitive incarceration.- For
256. McLoughlin, supra note 31, at 116.
257. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 21 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (2012)).
258. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION (2014), http://www
.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/2o1
4o43
oRFAmendments.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CV3-49DQ]; Sari Horwitz, justice Department




259. Memorandum on Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and
Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y
Gen., to the U.S. Att'ys and Assistant Att'y Gen. for the Criminal Div. 2 (Aug.
12, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2o14/07/23/ag-memo
-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements
-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [http://perma.cc/AL3V-NT2E]; Memorandum on Retroactive
Application of Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidi-
vist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., to the U.S.
Attorneys and Assistant Att'y Gen. for the Criminal Div. i (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2014/o4/i/ag-memo-to-usas-and-aag-crm-retro
activity-of-drug-policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/58QS-CCPR].
260. Sari Horwitz, Obama Commutes the Sentences of 1o2 More Federal Drug Offenders, WASH.
POST (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama
-commutes-the-sentences-of-1o2-more-federal-drug-offenders/2o16/1o/o6/e66 5 7 8d6-8bff
-nle6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4story.html [http://perma.cc/53RD-SPQP]; see also Barack
Obama, The President's Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARv. L. REv. 812, 824-
38 (2017) (discussing President Obama's efforts at reforming sentencing practices caused by
the War on Drugs).
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example, in 2009, New York sent more drug offenders to treatment instead of
prison.26 ' Studies demonstrate that those receiving treatment have been less
likely to recidivate than those who were incarcerated.262 There has also been an
increased focus on treatment for offenders in prison. The National Institute on
Drug Abuse has stated that "[t]reatment offers the best alternative for inter-
rupting the drug use/criminal justice cycle for offenders with drug prob-
lems . . . . Untreated substance using offenders are more likely to relapse into
drug use and criminal behavior, jeopardizing public health and safety and tax-
ing criminal justice system resources."2 63
B. War on Terror
Although the United States has adopted a variety of reforms to counter the
negative effects of the War on Drugs on African American communities, the
lessons learned from adopting these changes have not yet been translated into
the War on Terror context. A major reason for this difference is that while
Americans across the political spectrum now recognize that young African
American drug offenders were unjustly characterized as irredeemable "super-
predators,"2 64 fears of young American Muslims as unrepentant violent terror-
ists continue to dominate public discourse. If anything, with the rise of ISIS
and violent acts committed by Muslims in San Bernardino and Orlando -as
well as throughout Europe, the Middle East, and other parts of the world-
those fears are more pronounced today. As a result, politicians, and even judg-
es,265 are pressured to look "tough" on terrorism, and it is doubtful they would
institute reforms that reduce prison sentences for Muslims convicted of terror-
ism offenses.266
261. Erin Durkin, Higher Percentage of New York Drug Offenders Being Sent to Treatment Rather
than Prison: Study, N.Y. DAiLY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.nydailynews
.com/new-york/nyc-crime/higher-percent-drug-offenders-treatment-prison-article-1.20847
07 [http://perma.cc/H9QK-ZS4K].
262. Nat'1 Inst. of Justice, Program Profile: Drug Treatment Alternative to Prison (DTAP), U.S.
DEP'T JUST. (May 25, 2011), http://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=89
[http://perma.cc/74WH-Q94W].
263. Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Drug Addiction Treatment in the Criminal justice System, NAT'L
INST. HEALTH (Apr. 2014), http://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/criminal-justice/drug
-addiction-treatment-in-criminal-justice-system [http://perma.cc/ELKS-CXD5].
264. Lamberti, supra note 188, at 332; Punishment and Prejudice, supra note 67.
265. Rascoff, supra note 163, at 873 n.204 ("Unlike counterpart institutions overseas, American
courts have been notoriously reluctant to superintend counterterrorism policy.").
266. See, e.g., Aziz, supra note 151, at 203 ("[I] mplementation of current 'hard on terror' strategies
has led to promotions, public recognition, and more votes for law enforcement officers,
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However, just as policymakers have recognized the benefits of strengthen-
ing efforts to rehabilitate offenders in the drug enforcement context, they
should also establish a counterterrorism policy that would work with defend-
ants to address the underlying causes for their criminal conduct and focus on
rehabilitation instead of lengthy punitive incapacitation.267 Such a policy would
help build greater trust of law enforcement in Muslim communities and ensure
terrorism offenders receive the treatment they need to successfully integrate
back into society when their sentences are completed.
This is especially true for the young American Muslims discussed in this
Feature. As explained above, many other countries have implemented rehabili-
tation programs to work with young Muslims who have committed terrorism
offenses.2 68 Because individuals sympathize with and join terrorist groups for a
variety of different reasons, successful programs "are very individualized in or-
der to address the grievances that drove someone to extremist groups in the
first place."2 69 Such grievances include the killing and subjugation of Muslims
by Western and Middle Eastern governments, feelings of racial and religious
discrimination in their home countries, as well as personal issues, such as prob-
lems with family, school, mental health, and employment.2 70 Furthermore,
"risk reduction" strategies have proven to be more effective than "de-
radicalization" ones.27 1 Instead of attempting to change individuals' political
and religious beliefs-which is very difficult to do-these programs focus on
notwithstanding the significant adverse consequences to Muslim communities' rights.");
Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 213, at 846 (noting that state legislatures are "largely moti-
vated by a political incentive to appear 'tough on terrorism' by expanding the scope of anti-
terrorism statutes and allowing for them to cover broader factual contexts ... in order to
satisfy the American people's demand that aggressive steps be taken to reduce the cata-
strophic risks of terrorism and ensure their safety").
267. See Skinner, supra note 32, at 345 ("[I]nclusion of some rehabilitative considerations would
focus the sentencing courts on the long-term objectives of this war, which include diminish-
ing the root causes of terrorism.").
268. See supra Section II.B.3.
269. Temple-Raston, supra note 171; see also QIASS Report, supra note 172, at 7 ("In countering
violent extremism, one size does not fit all (or even most).").
270. See, e.g., Reitman, supra note 81 ("These kids identify as Muslims. And what they see are
young Muslims in the tens of thousands being killed in Syria by barrel bombs -and the
Western press doesn't report this. We report on the killers. They see the victims."); Rosin,
supra note 172 ("Organizations like ISIS take advantage of people who, because of racism or
religious or political discrimination, have been pushed to the margins of society."); Temple-
Raston, supra note 171 ("Studies have shown that by strengthening family ties, parents and
siblings end up providing the support young people were missing and subsequently sought
and found in extremist groups.").
271. See Dratel, supra note 11, at 39-40.
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modifying their behavior so that they are less likely to commit acts of violence
or provide support to militant groups.2 72
Despite these efforts around the globe,7 in the United States, young Mus-
lims who have committed terrorism offenses, for the most part, have no alter-
native to lengthy incarceration with little to no rehabilitative component.27 4
Although many of the defendants discussed in this Feature expressed remorse
for their actions, prosecutors routinely dismissed their statements as self-
serving pleas to obtain reduced sentences, and instead repeated the mantra
"that terrorists cannot be deterred or rehabilitated."2 75 Recently, however, the
U.S. government has begun recognizing that rehabilitation should play a role
in combating support for terrorism among young American Muslims."' The
272. See id.
273. Interestingly, for suspected militants detained in Iraq, the United States military has created
a rehabilitative alternative to detention called Task Force 134. See id. at 48.
274. A former National Counterterrorism Center official noted that it is "an abject failure ... that
there is no system in place that doesn't result in spending 20 years in jail." Apuzzo, supra
note 170.
275. United States v. Bell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
276. Some academics have expressed concerns about the government playing a role in rehabilitat-
ing Muslims who have supported foreign terrorist organizations. Sahar Aziz, for example,
criticizes strategies of having Muslim community leaders collaborate with the FBI to inter-
vene to "prevent terrorist recruitment of young men who suffer from mental health illnesses,
personal crises, or other sources of emotional vulnerability." Aziz, supra note 151, at 213. She
worries that such initiatives "could prove devastating to Muslim communities' collective lib-
erty interests," because they promote intra-community spying and censorship and falsely as-
sume "that domestic terrorists who are Muslim are integrated into Muslim-American com-
munities." Id. at 213-14. While Aziz raises important concerns regarding individuals who
have not yet been charged with terrorism-related crimes, this Feature focuses solely on those
Muslims who have already been convicted and are awaiting sentencing. To assist in rehabili-
tating these individuals, coordination between government officials and Muslim community
groups would not raise the same concerns.
Similarly, Samuel J. Rascoff argues that government-sponsored rehabilitation pro-
grams could be counterproductive and violate the Establishment Clause to the extent they
promote "'Official Islam': a government-sponsored account of 'mainstream Islam' offered by
the state in place of radical doctrinal alternatives." Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Is-
lam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REv. 124, 130 (2012). How-
ever, to the extent rehabilitation efforts focus on "risk reduction" and not altering individu-
als' political and religious beliefs, the Establishment Clause likely will not be implicated.
And, to the extent religion does play a role, community religious groups would be providing
counseling, not government officials. Even Rascoff acknowledges that if "grassroots non-
governmental organizations play a more decisive role in counter-radicalization efforts;' his
arguments "are diminished." Id. at 18o. Notably, religion has played a role in rehabilitating
offenders in other contexts, including the use of prison chaplains and religious-based pro-
grams like Alcoholics Anonymous. See, e.g., Jones v. Smid, No. 4-89-CV-20859, 1993 WL
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Obama Administration's Countering Violent Extremism program277 and the
House of Representatives' Homeland Security Committee have endorsed such
efforts.m The FBI has even worked with community leaders, mental health
experts, and religious figures to intervene with minors and mentally ill individ-
uals.279 The most significant efforts have occurred in Minneapolis.2 80 In the
case of Abdullahi Yusuf, who pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material
support for attempting to fly to Syria to join ISIS when he was eighteen, the
district judge agreed to a presentence rehabilitation program, allowing Yusuf to
stay at a halfway house and receive counseling and services from a local non-
profit.281 The judge also has appointed an expert to determine whether other
defendants could benefit from similar services.
Yet, despite these efforts, the United States still has no rehabilitation pro-
grams in federal prisons for those serving sentences for terrorism crimes.
719562 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 29, 1993) (holding that the inmate's participation in a treatment
program modeled on precepts of Alcoholics Anonymous did not interfere with the inmate's
practice of his religion or establish religion). Certain federal districts even use religious or-
ganizations to help offenders reintegrate into society. See, e.g., Project H.O.P.E. Re-Entry Ini-
tiative, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdal/programs/ex-offender-re
-entry-initiative [http://perma.cc/XV7U-LPD7] (discussing the Southern District of Ala-
bama's Project H.O.P.E. program, which requests the assistance of "service provider[s],
business[es], employer[s], non-profit entit[ies], [and] religious organization[s]" to "address
the needs of re-entering ex-offenders in order to make their transition back into
mai[ns]tream society a success" (emphasis added)).
277. Empowering Local Partners, supra note 215.
278. Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel, HouSE HOME-
LAND SEC. COMM. 34-35 (Sept. 2015) [hereinafter Task Force on Combatting Terrorist and For-
eign Fighter Travel], http://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/o9/TaskForce
FinalReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/656H-TWT7].
279. Apuzzo, supra note 170; see also Illusion of fustice, supra note 28, at 175 ("In the US, there are
at least a handful of cases where the government adopted a 'soft intervention' approach and
referred individuals to local community partners.").
280. See Shane, supra note 238.
281. Id.; Dina Temple-Raston, He Was Caught Trying To join ISIS, Now He's in Jihadi Rehab,
WBUR (May 16, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/npr/478257287/he-was-caught-trying-to
-join-isis-now-hes-in-jihadi-rehab [http://perma.cc/8Q95-43D4].
282. Temple-Raston, supra note 281.
283. United States v. Bell, 81 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2015) ("David Schiavone with the
Federal Bureau of Prisons confirmed in his testimony that the BOP currently has no pro-
grams for de-radicalizing prisoners convicted of crimes of terrorism." (citation omitted)); id.
at 1325 ("[I]n the years to come, one would expect more comprehensive methods for reha-
bilitating would-be terrorists will be developed."); see also Dratel, supra note 11, at 59 (noting
"the invariably long sentences in 'material support' cases, and the lack of any legitimate re-
habilitative programs for inmates in such facilities").
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Recognizing this shortcoming, some judges have noted that lengthy terms of
supervised release can be used to both monitor individuals after they have been
released from prison and provide them with resources to help integrate them
back into society.284 In the aftermath of the War on Drugs, treatment programs
have been established by federal courts for drug offenders serving terms of su-
pervised release to help them "establish[] a sober, employed, law abiding life in
an effort to promote public safety, . . . and to promote rehabilitation."285 Similar
rehabilitation programs should be created for young nonviolent terrorism
offenders while on supervised release. By keeping track of their whereabouts
and providing them rehabilitative resources, such programs would reduce the
need to sentence these individuals to long terms of incarceration. Overall, just
as with the recent changes to War on Drugs policies, in order to have a more
effective and just counterterrorism strategy, policymakers should not only es-
tablish rehabilitation programs for terrorism offenders during and after their
criminal sentences, but also reform sentencing policies like the Terrorism En-
hancement to allow for sentences that properly take into consideration the in-
dividual circumstances of each defendant.
CONCLUSION
Similar to the War on Drugs, the War on Terror has led to the imposition
of lengthy criminal sentences for young nonviolent offenders. These policies
disproportionately target a particular minority community, resulting in sen-
tences that are contrary to the purposes delineated by Congress in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and that undermine effective government policies to combat harm in
the United States. In the War on Drugs, recent changes in judicial precedent,
the Sentencing Guidelines, and charging policies have led to a reduction in the
length of sentences, and policymakers have focused on alternative means of ad-
dressing drug-related crimes and rehabilitating offenders. For the most part,
similar reforms have not been made in the War on Terror.
In recent years, advocates and academics have argued that changes in ter-
rorism sentencing laws are necessary to establish more effective and just poli-
284. See, e.g., Bell, 81 F. Supp. 3 d at 1325 ("The Court also has the tool of an extended period of
supervised release to closely monitor Bell's activity even after he is released from prison.");
Dratel, supra note II, at 94 (noting that rehabilitation programs can be created "for convict-
ed defendants as part of their probation or supervised release").
285. Court Assisted Recovery Effort, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR DISTRICT MASS., http://
www.mad.uscourts.gov/outreach/recovery.htm [http://perma.cc/TH6C-UEAV]; see Types
of Drug Courts, NAT'L Ass'N DRUG CT. PROFESSIONALS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what
-are-drug-courts/models [http://perma.cc/PDTS-Y6DV].
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cies. Said recommends "that some combination of Congress, the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission, and the federal courts establish standards to help courts bet-
ter decide when a heightened punishment might be warranted, free from un-
supported assumptions about the nature of terrorism or a particular
defendant."286 Skinner calls for "a new sentencing framework" based on "rea-
sonableness (proportionality and necessity), and mitigating (and aggravating)
circumstances."287 The new framework would "provide courts with legal tools
to distinguish between gradations of terrorist conduct" and "consider[] a de-
fendant's 'substantial steps' toward the terrorism offense and the motives for
his conduct." 288 Human Rights Watch asks the Sentencing Commission to
" [c] onduct a study assessing whether the current system of sentence enhance-
ments for terrorism is furthering appropriate criminal justice goals and is well-
tailored to best meet those goals" and narrow the Terrorism Enhancement "to
apply only to federal crimes of terrorism, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)."28 9
Dratel argues that prosecutors and judges should use 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(c),
which authorizes the use of civil injunctive authority in material support cases,
to order nonviolent terrorism offenders to participate in rehabilitation pro-
grams in lieu of criminal incarceration. 90
These potential reforms would be important steps in addressing many of
the problems analyzed in this Feature. However, it is unlikely that any will be
implemented by government officials, at least in the short-term. Americans to-
day view terrorism much differently than "ordinary" violent crimes or drug
crimes. 291 The "super-predator" -a remorseless young African American man
286. Said, supra note 5o, at 481-82.
287. Skinner, supra note 32, at 345.
288. Id. at 349, 357.
289. Illusion offustice, supra note 28, at 185.
290. Dratel, supra note ii, at 93 (noting that, pursuant to their discretionary equitable authority,
"courts can be innovative and affirmative in imposing customized conditions such
as .. . counseling and other programming (including vocational if appropriate), religious in-
struction, some form of supervision and reporting, restricted internet access, associational
and travel limitations, financial monitoring, and even home detention and/or electronic
monitoring" (footnote omitted)).
291. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 213, at 848 ("[S]ince the September ii attacks, fear and
anxiety have dominated the public's perception of actors who are labeled 'terrorists,' and
therefore using the 'terrorism' rhetoric critically influences public perceptions of crime and
punishment."); id. (noting that with the War on Terror "powerful emotions, particularly ha-
tred and fear, often prevail over rational legal doctrines, resulting in significant deviations in
criminal law and procedure" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Huq et al., supra note 64,
at 423 (noting that "people may respond differently to counterterrorism policing than to
crime-control because they view terrorism as imposing a graver risk of harm to individuals
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bent on creating havoc through gang and drug violence -has been replaced by
the "terrorist" -a remorseless young Muslim man bent on killing as many
Americans as possible. Until the discourse shifts to a more nuanced and realis-
tic framing of the range of individuals convicted of terrorism crimes -as well as
the actual threat faced by the United States - changes to the current sentencing
framework are unlikely. Given that Donald Trump, who has advocated banning
all Muslims from entering the United States, was elected President, the country
appears to be moving in the opposite direction.
Despite Trump's alarming rhetoric, certain incremental changes can and
should be implemented to lower sentences and increase rehabilitation efforts
for young, nonviolent Muslims convicted of terrorism offenses. Using their
discretion under Booker, more trial judges should issue lower sentences in ter-
rorism cases to reflect more accurately the circumstances of the offense and
characteristics of the individual defendant. Although courts of appeals have
overturned terrorism sentences that deviate too significantly from the Guide-
lines, judges are more insulated from public fears regarding terrorism than the
political branches of government, and are more able to sanction nuanced sen-
tencing procedures. Moreover, members of all branches of the federal govern-
ment have recognized the importance of creating rehabilitation programs to
address the needs and underlying causes of those convicted of terrorism offens-
es. Such programs should be formed in the near future,2 92 and to be successful,
they should focus on individualized treatment, positive relations with local
community groups, and risk reduction.
In 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder stated:
Getting smart on crime requires talking openly about which policies
have worked and which have not. And we have to do so without worry-
ing about being labeled as too soft or too hard on crime. Getting smart
on crime means moving beyond useless labels and catch-phrases, and
instead relying on science and data to shape policy.293
Although Holder was addressing the continuing need to reform sentencing
laws due to over-incarceration caused by the War on Drugs, his words are as
relevant to the over-incarceration of young, nonviolent American Muslims
than the more diffuse consequences of ordinary crime" and "may have different normative
assessments of crime and terrorism").
292. See Empowering Local Partners, supra note 215; Task Force on Combatting Terrorist and Foreign
Fighter Travel, supra note 278.
293. Eric Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., Address at the 2oo9 ABA Convention, U.S. DEP'T JUST.
(Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-2009-aba
-convention [http://perma.cc/NEC5-J83K].
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caused by the War on Terror. If the government truly wants to get smart on
addressing the threat from foreign terrorist organizations like ISIS, it should
establish fair and effective sentencing policies that focus on rehabilitation as
much as incapacitation and punishment.
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